Get Divorced and move on plus Domestic Violence cases: September 2019

Thursday, September 12, 2019

Dv reserved where defendant not advised to seek counsel B.P., v. R.P.,

Dv reserved where defendant not advised to seek counsel B.P.,
v.

R.P.,

Defendant-Appellant.
___________________________

Submitted March 25, 2019 – Decided May 9, 2019

Before Judges Gooden Brown and Rose.

On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey,
Chancery Division, Family Part, Essex County, Docket
No. FV-07-1641-18.
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the
internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-4122-17T1

PER CURIAM
Defendant appeals from an April 2, 2018 final restraining order (FRO),

entered in favor of plaintiff (his ex-wife) under the Prevention of Domestic

Violence Act (PDVA), N.J.S.A. 2C:25-17 to -35. On December 8, 2017,

plaintiff was granted a temporary restraining order (TRO) based on a domestic

violence complaint alleging that on December 7, 2017, defendant harassed her

and the parties' children by sending a threatening email after plaintiff failed to

respond to his request to visit the children. Following a lengthy trial on non-

consecutive days, during which defendant appeared pro se while plaintiff was

represented by counsel, the trial court entered the FRO after determining that

defendant had committed the predicate act of harassment, and that an FRO was

necessary to prevent further abuse. See Silver v. Silver, 387 N.J. Super. 112,

125-27 (App. Div. 2006).

On appeal, defendant raises the following points for our consideration:

POINT I

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT RELIED
UPON MULTIPLE INCREDIBLE HEARSAY
STATEMENTS IN REACHING ITS DECISION
WHICH WERE UNSUPPORTED BY COMPETENT
EVIDENCE AND OFFEND[S] THE INTERESTS OF
JUSTICE.

A-4122-17T1
2
POINT II

THE TRIAL COURT HAS AN AFFIRMATIVE
DUTY TO INTERVENE TO ENSURE A FAIR TRIAL
WHICH WAS NEGATED BY ITS REPEATED
ADMISSION OF HEARSAY AND PREJUDICIAL
EVIDENCE INTO THE RECORD.

POINT III

THE TRIAL [COURT] ERRED WHEN IT
CONVERTED THE TRIAL ON AN ALLEGED ACT
OF D[O]MESTIC VIOLENCE INTO ONE FOR ACTS
WHICH WERE NOT ALLEGED IN THE
COMPLAINT.

POINT IV

THE TRIAL COURT VIOLATED . . . DEFENDANT'S
DUE PROCESS RIGHTS BY FAILING TO INFORM
DEFENDANT OF HIS RIGHT TO COUNSEL OR
THE CONSEQUENCES THAT COULD RESULT
FROM[] A FINAL RESTRAINING ORDER;
THEREBY, OFFENDING THE INTERESTS OF
JUSTICE.

POINT V

THE COURT SHIFTED THE BURDEN OF PROOF
FROM . . . PLAINTIFF TO . . . DEFENDANT
REQUIRING THAT HE PROVE THAT HE DID NOT
SEND OR CAUSE TO SEND . . . PLAINTIFF THE
ALLEGED EMAIL.

A-4122-17T1
3
Because we agree that the court failed to inform defendant of his right to counsel

or the serious consequences that could result from the entry of an FRO against

him, we reverse.

We have previously stated that an FRO "is not merely an injunction

entered in favor of one private litigant against the other." J.S. v. D.S., 448 N.J.

Super. 17, 22 (App. Div. 2016). Instead, courts "have consistently recognized

that the issuance of an FRO 'has serious consequences to the personal and

professional lives of those who are found guilty of what the Legislature has

characterized as a serious crime against society.'" Franklin v. Sloskey, 385 N.J.

Super. 534, 541 (App. Div. 2006) (quoting Bresocnik v. Gallegos, 367 N.J.

Super. 178, 181 (App. Div. 2004)); see also N.J.S.A. 2C:25-18. In fact, "[o]nce

a final restraining order is entered, a defendant is subject to fingerprinting,

N.J.S.A. 53:1-15, and the Administrative Office of the Courts [(AOC)]

maintains a central registry of all persons who have had domestic violence

restraining orders entered against them, N.J.S.A. 2C:25-34." Ibid. (quoting

Peterson v. Peterson, 374 N.J. Super. 116, 124 (App. Div. 2005)).

In addition, "[v]iolation of a restraining order constitutes contempt, and a

second or subsequent non-indictable domestic violence contempt offense

requires a minimum term of thirty days imprisonment. N.J.S.A. 2C:25-30."

A-4122-17T1
4
Peterson, 374 N.J. Super. at 124. "The issuing court may also impose a number

of other wide-reaching sanctions impairing a defendant's interests in liberty and

freedom in order 'to prevent further abuse.' N.J.S.A. 2C:25-29(b)." Ibid. See

also D.N. v. K.M., 216 N.J. 587, 593 (2014) (Albin, J., dissenting) (cataloging

the consequences under N.J.S.A. 2C:25-29(b) resulting from entry of a domestic

violence FRO).

Thus, the right to seek counsel is an important due process right that

affords defendants "a meaningful opportunity to defend against a complaint in

domestic violence matters[.]" D.N. v. K.M., 429 N.J. Super. 592, 606 (App.

Div. 2013). Although due process does not require the appointment of counsel

for indigent defendants opposing the entry of an FRO in a domestic violence

proceeding, fundamental fairness requires that a defendant understand that he or

she has a right to obtain legal counsel, and that a defendant is afforded a

reasonable opportunity to retain an attorney. Ibid.

"[E]nsuring that defendants are not deprived of their due process rights

requires our trial courts to recognize both what those rights are and how they

can be protected consistent with the protective goals of the [PDVA]." J.D. v.

M.D.F., 207 N.J. 458, 479 (2011). Thus, in D.N., we concluded that the

defendant relinquished her right to seek counsel because the judge "adequately

A-4122-17T1
5
questioned [her] regarding her decision to decline the opportunity to obtain legal

representation." D.N., 429 N.J. Super. at 607. There, the trial judge asked D.N.

(1) whether she wanted the opportunity to obtain counsel, pointing out that the

opposing party was represented; (2) whether she understood what would happen

if a final restraining order was entered; and (3) whether she knew that she might

be subject to civil penalties and other consequences. Ibid. The judge also

advised D.N. that she could request an adjournment to consult with an attorney

or further prepare for the final hearing. Ibid. Given that advice, we held that

D.N.'s waiver of her right to seek counsel was clear and knowing. Ibid.

Here, defendant was never informed of the significant consequences of an

FRO. For instance, on January 5, 2018, when defendant expressed his concern

that "serious allegations . . . [were] hanging over [his] head," the court agreed,

but failed to elaborate on the serious consequences resulting from the issuance

of an FRO, including fingerprinting and entry into the domestic violence

registry. In a later colloquy on January 26, 2018, the court again dismissed

defendant's concerns about the allegations without further explication:

[Defendant]: . . . . I just thought because, ultimately, [I
am] being accused of a crime . . . .

The Court: Well, [it is] not a crime.

....

A-4122-17T1
6
The Court: . . . . It [does not] [rise] to that level. [It is]
not a criminal matter. [It is] a civil matter.

[Defendant]: Oh, because when we initially appeared
--

The Court: Okay, [you are] not threatened with jail.

[Defendant]: -- the magistrate said that the end result of
this could be a criminal charge. He was quite clear
about that.

The Court: Well, if you violate a [TRO], that is a
criminal charge.

Likewise, nowhere in the record did the court advise defendant of his right

to obtain counsel. That failure was particularly significant in this case because

defendant had asserted that evidence was "being sprung upon [him] with no

opportunity to prepare" and no "amend[ment to] the TRO[.]" See L.D. v. W.D.,

Jr., 327 N.J. Super. 1, 4 (App. Div. 1999) ("[I]t constitutes a fundamental

violation of due process to convert a hearing on a complaint alleging one act of

domestic violence into a hearing on other acts of domestic violence which are

not even alleged in the complaint." (quoting J.F. v. B.K., 308 N.J. Super. 387,

391-92 (App. Div. 1998))); see also J.D., 207 N.J. at 478 ("[A]t a minimum, due

process requires that a party in a judicial hearing receive 'notice defining the

issues and an adequate opportunity to prepare and respond.'" (quoting H.E.S. v.

A-4122-17T1
7
J.C.S., 175 N.J. 309, 321 (2003))). Indeed, aside from the court confirming on

January 5, 2018, that defendant was self-represented, and indicating on February

23, 2018, that it was "not being as strict as [it] could" because defendant was

"self-represented," there was no discussion or explanation of defendant's right

to obtain counsel by the court, or any express waiver of the right to seek counsel

by defendant.

As a result, we vacate the FRO, reinstate the TRO, and remand for a new

hearing. Because of our decision, we need not address defendant's remaining

arguments other than to remind the trial court that "evidence presented [at a

domestic violence trial] must meet the test for admission as provided by our

Rules of Evidence." R.G. v. R.G., 449 N.J. Super. 208, 222 (App. Div. 2017).

On remand, in fairness to the FRO judge, who made credibility findings, we

direct that a different judge conduct the new hearing. R. 1:12-1(d); Pressler &

Verniero, Current N.J. Court Rules, cmt. 4 on R. 1:12-1 (2019) ("[A] matter

remanded after appeal for a new trial should be assigned to a different trial judge

if the first judge had, during the original trial, expressed conclusions regarding

witness credibility.").

Reversed and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this

opinion. We do not retain jurisdiction.

Court amending DV complaint to allege harassment violated defendants rights S.C. v. Z.B.

Court amending DV complaint to allege harassment violated defendants rights S.C. v. Z.B. SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISIONApr 2, 2019DOCKET NO. A-2310-17T4 (N.J. Super. App. Div. Apr. 2, 2019) PER CURIAM

RECORD IMPOUNDED

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R.1:36-3. Before Judges Fuentes, Accurso and Vernoia. On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey, Chancery Division, Family Part, Essex County, Docket No. FV-07-1089-18. Joseph R. Donahue argued the cause for appellant (Brickfield & Donahue, attorneys; Joseph R. Donahue, on the briefs). David A. Schwartz argued the cause for respondent (Schwartz & Posnock, attorneys; David A. Schwartz, on the brief). PER CURIAM

Defendant Z.B. appeals from a December 11, 2017 final restraining order (FRO) entered in favor of her husband, plaintiff S.C., pursuant to the Prevention of Domestic Violence Act of 1991 (PDVA), N.J.S.A. 2C:25-17to -35. We reverse.

The pertinent facts may be simply stated. Plaintiff and defendant are married and have two children. On October 6, 2017, plaintiff and defendant had a verbal altercation in the marital home. Plaintiff called 9-1-1, and police responded to the scene. Plaintiff filed a complaint, alleging defendant engaged in domestic violence under the PDVA, N.J.S.A. 2C:25-19(a)(10), by committing the predicate act of criminal mischief, N.J.S.A. 2C:17-3. Plaintiff alleged a "verbal dispute escalated into . . . defendant breaking a dish in front of . . . plaintiff and the children." The complaint also alleged a prior history of domestic violence, stating defendant "physically struck" plaintiff "[three] to [four] times in previous incidents." The court issued a temporary domestic violence restraining order against defendant.

Four days later, defendant filed a domestic violence complaint alleging that during the October 6, 2017 incident, plaintiff engaged in domestic violence under the PDVA, N.J.S.A. 2C:25-19(a)(10)and (13), by committing the predicate acts of criminal mischief, N.J.S.A. 2C:17-3, and harassment, N.J.S.A. 2C:33-4. More particularly, the complaint alleged plaintiff "shoved [defendant] aside, grabbed [a] plate from her hand . . . and flung [it] on the floor, breaking it into pieces." Defendant's complaint further alleged plaintiff committed prior acts of domestic violence against her, including throwing her on the kitchen floor and punching her in the lip on January 3, 2014, erasing the operating system from her computer, breaking a lock in her bedroom, threatening to permanently take their children to India, throwing a package of bagels "in her face," and calling her names. On October 10, 2017, the court issued a temporary domestic violence restraining order against plaintiff.

The Family Part conducted a five-day trial and heard testimony from plaintiff, defendant, a police officer who responded to the parties' home on October 6, 2017, and three of defendant's friends who saw and spoke with her before and after the verbal altercation. After the presentation of the evidence and closing arguments of counsel, the court rendered an opinion from the bench detailing its findings of fact and conclusions of law. The court first confirmed with counsel that plaintiff's complaint asserted only that defendant committed the predicate act of criminal mischief under the PDVA and that there had not been any amendments to plaintiff's complaint during trial. Similarly, the court confirmed defendant's complaint alleged only that plaintiff committed the predicate acts of criminal mischief and harassment under the PDVA. The court explained that it confirmed the allegations in the complaints "to be very clear on the record that [it] had the proper restraining orders that [it was] working with" because the court "always like[d] to be very careful about that, when making the record" and "utilizing the proper complaints." The court noted both complaints alleged criminal mischief, but only defendant's complaint also alleged harassment as a predicate act supporting her FRO request. There were no requests by counsel to amend the complaints or any objection to the court's summary of the allegations in the complaint.

The court then addressed the credibility of the witnesses, generally finding defendant "intentionally testified falsely," and rejecting her testimony that she was not intoxicated at the time of the altercation, she did not break the plate and that plaintiff broke the plate. The court found credible plaintiff's testimony that defendant was intoxicated and broke the plate, defendant used offensive language during the altercation and defendant committed prior acts of domestic violence against plaintiff.

The court, however, concluded plaintiff did not "prove[] criminal mischief," the only predicate act of domestic violence alleged in his complaint against defendant. Undeterred by the absence of any allegation in plaintiff's complaint that defendant committed the predicate act of harassment, the court declared it would "sua sponte amend the complaint [against defendant] to find that—that the facts set will apply to a count of harassment and therefore . . . consider[ed] that count in the complaint for—and under—under the statute [N.J.S.A.] 2C:33-4 under harassment." Although the complaint did not allege defendant committed the predicate act of harassment, the court nevertheless based its determination that plaintiff is entitled to an FRO against defendant under the PDVA on its finding defendant committed the predicate act of harassment. Following the court's entry of the FRO, defendant appealed.

The court did not make findings of fact supporting its conclusion that plaintiff failed to prove defendant committed the predicate act of criminal mischief under the PDVA. See R.1:7-4. Plaintiff did not cross-appeal the court's order finding he failed to prove criminal mischief, see Mondelli v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 102 N.J. 167, 170 (1986)(where defendants did not file a cross-appeal, the court's review was "confined to the sole issue raised on plaintiff's appeal"), and does not argue on appeal that the court erred by finding he failed to prove criminal mischief, see Jefferson Loan Co. v. Session, 397 N.J. Super. 520, 525n.4 (App. Div. 2008) (noting an issue not briefed on appeal is deemed waived).

The court also based its decision to issue the FRO on its finding plaintiff proved a need for an FRO to protect him from immediate danger and further acts of domestic violence. See Silver v. Silver, 387 N.J. Super. 112, 127(App. Div. 2006). Defendant does not challenge that finding on appeal, and we therefore do not address it. See Sklodowsky v. Lushis,417 N.J. Super. 648, 657(App. Div. 2011) (holding that an issue not briefed on appeal is deemed waived). --------

A trial court has a "two-fold" task when deciding whether to grant an FRO under the PDVA. Silver, 387 N.J. Super. at 125. The court must first determine whether the plaintiff has proven, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the defendant committed one of the predicate acts referenced in N.J.S.A. 2C:25-19(a), which incorporates harassment, N.J.S.A. 2C:33-4, as conduct constituting domestic violence. See Silver, 387 N.J. Super. at 125-26. If a predicate offense is proven, the judge must then assess "whether a restraining order is necessary, upon an evaluation of the factors set forth in N.J.S.A. 2C:25-29(a)(1) to -29(a)(6), to protect the victim from an immediate danger or to prevent further abuse." Silver,387 N.J. Super. at 127(quoted in J.D. v. M.D.F., 207 N.J. 458, 475-76 (2011)).

Defendant argues the court erred by basing its issuance of the FRO on its finding she committed the predicate act of harassment. Defendant contends the court's finding violated her due process rights because the complaint did not allege she committed the predicate act of harassment, plaintiff never moved to amend the complaint to allege the predicate act of harassment and the court determined defendant committed the predicate act only after the close of evidence and based on its sua sponte amendment of the complaint during its decision on the merits. We agree and reverse.

"A litigant in civil proceedings is entitled to a fair hearing, imbued with the protections of due process." In re Adoption of Child ex. rel. M.E.B.,444 N.J. Super. 83, 88(App. Div. 2016). Both the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, paragraph 1, of the New Jersey Constitution protect the due process rights of defendants in actions brought under the PDVA. H.E.S. v. J.C.S., 175 N.J. 309, 321 (2003). "At a minimum, due process requires that a party in a judicial hearing receive 'notice defining the issues and an adequate opportunity to prepare and respond.'" Id.at 321-22 (quoting McKeown-Brand v. Trump Castle Hotel & Casino, 132 N.J. 546, 559 (1993)). "[I]n all cases the trial court must ensure that [the] defendant [in an FRO proceeding under the PDVA] is afforded an adequate opportunity to be apprised of [the] allegations [in the complaint] and to prepare." J.D., 207 N.J. at 480.

During a trial on a complaint seeking an FRO under the PDVA, the court may allow an amendment of the complaint to expand its allegations, but only where a defendant's due process rights are not violated. H.E.S., 175 N.J. at 324. For example, "[a] due process violation can easily be avoided by granting a party a reasonable adjournment if confronted by new allegations at the time of trial in order to afford the party an ample opportunity to meet the charges." Pazienza v. Camarata, 381 N.J. Super. 173, 185(App. Div. 2005); see also H.E.S., 175 N.J. at 323.

However, in J.F. v. B.K., we reversed an FRO based on a trial court's finding that the defendant committed an act of domestic violence "based not on the act of domestic violence alleged in [the] plaintiff's complaint but rather on a course of prior conduct which . . . was not even mentioned in the complaint." 308 N.J. Super. 387, 391(App. Div. 1998). We found it is "a fundamental violation of due process to convert a hearing on a complaint alleging one act of domestic violence into a hearing on other acts of domestic violence which are not even alleged in the complaint." Id.at 391-92; see also L.D. v. W.D., 327 N.J. Super. 1, 4(App. Div. 1999) (noting "it is clearly improper to base a finding of domestic violence upon acts or a course of conduct not even mentioned in the complaint").

Here, the court's sua sponte decision to amend plaintiff's complaint during its final decision on the merits violated defendant's due process rights. The complaint did not allege defendant committed the predicate act of harassment, and during the presentation of the evidence the complaint was never amended to add the claim. Thus, defendant never had what due process requires: adequate notice of the allegation upon which the FRO was ultimately founded. J.D., 207 N.J. at 480. Instead, after finding defendant did not commit the only predicate act alleged in the complaint, the court unilaterally and inexplicably chose to add a claim that was never requested or alleged and, in doing so, deprived

Tracking device not grounds for DV K.M., v. M.D.,

Tracking device not grounds for DV

K.M.,

M.D.,

Defendant-Respondent.
_____________________________

Argued January 29, 2019 – Decided May 23, 2019

Before Judges Yannotti and Rothstadt.

On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey,
Chancery Division, Family Part, Essex County, Docket
No. FV-07-3707-17.

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the
internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-0691-17T3

PER CURIAM

Plaintiff K.M. appeals from the Family Part's July 31, 2017 order

dismissing his domestic violence complaint that he filed against his estranged
wife, defendant, M.D. 1 The trial court judge initially determined that defendant

committed the criminal act of stalking, N.J.S.A. 2C:12-10, a predicate offense

under the Prevention of Domestic Violence Act (PDVA), N.J.S.A. 2C:25-19(a),

by installing a GPS tracking device on plaintiff's vehicle. However, he

dismissed plaintiff's complaint because he also found that plaintiff failed to

prove under Silver v. Silver, 387 N.J. Super. 112 (App. Div. 2006), that a final

restraining order (FRO) was necessary to prevent any harm to him. On appeal,

plaintiff argues that the judge's decision should be reversed because the judge

misapplied Silver. We disagree and affirm, substantially for the reasons

expressed by Judge Bahir Kamil in his comprehensive oral decision placed on

the record on July 31, 2017.

At the time of their trial, the parties had been married for ten years, had

one child, a daughter, and were in the middle of a pending contentious divorce

that plaintiff filed in 2013. It was undisputed that in January 2016, defendant

purchased a GPS tracking device and placed it on plaintiff's truck without his

knowledge. According to defendant, she did so to monitor their daughter's

location when she was with plaintiff.

1
In this opinion, we refer to the parties and others by their initials, to protect
their identities.
A-0691-17T3
2
In May 2017, plaintiff discovered the tracking device. On June 27, 2017,

he filed his complaint under the PDVA for a restraining order against defendant

and alleged that she committed an act of stalking as the predicate offense. Based

on his complaint, a Family Part judge issued a temporary restraining order

(TRO) that was served on defendant the same day.

In his complaint, in addition to alleging his discovery of the tracking

device, plaintiff claimed that defendant admitted that she came to his residence

uninvited and, without his knowledge, "took their daughter to the beach on his

visitation weekend" and "call[ed] him degrading names, ma[de] insulting

comments, curse[d][,] and ma[de] threats to send him to jail or [that] he [would]

never see their daughter again." Describing a prior history of domestic violence,

plaintiff alleged that defendant "assaulted him by slamming a large heavy truck

door on his foot" and claimed that she "curse[d], yell[ed]/scream[ed], ma[de]

insulting comments[,] and call[ed] him degrading names."

On July 20, 2017, plaintiff amended his complaint to allege additional

facts regarding the tracking device, including that it had been on his vehicle for

a year and a half and defendant would call or text him about his whereabouts or

what he was doing without disclosing how she knew his location. He added that

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3
one time, minutes after leaving his older daughter's house,2 defendant called the

daughter and asked why plaintiff was over there, prompting the older daughter

to worry that someone was watching them. Plaintiff called this incident

"alarming" and characterized defendant's actions as taunting and harassing.

On July 31, 2017, the parties appeared before Judge Kamil for a final

hearing. At the outset, the parties stipulated to the fact that defendant placed

the tracker on plaintiff's truck. Plaintiff testified that prior to discovering the

tracking device, he received numerous invasive and "harassing messages" from

defendant at least once a week asking about his whereabouts. He noted that

defendant pinpointed his locations several times and once sent a picture of one

of his cars in front of a gym.

Plaintiff described defendant's messages relating to her knowledge of his

whereabouts as "alarming" and described how he went to Verizon and Apple to

see if there was "something going on with [his] phone." He stated that

defendant's messages were distracting him at work, affecting his sleep, and

having an impact upon his relationship with his older daughter. He also

described the incident when he went to his older daughter's house and a few

minutes after leaving, she called him "and said hey, [defendant] just called me

2
The older daughter was from an earlier marriage.
A-0691-17T3
4
and . . . wanted to know what you're doing at . . . my house. Why were you

there? And . . . [the] daughter said Dad, are we being watched? Are we being

followed? What's going on?"

Plaintiff then addressed the incident in which defendant allegedly

slammed his truck's door on his foot. He explained that it occurred on a day

when, despite defendant's promise that their daughter's belongings would be

ready at her house when plaintiff was to pick the daughter up, neither the

belongings nor defendant were at the house. Later, defendant brought the

belongings to the daughter's friend's house, where she knew plaintiff would be

stopping. According to plaintiff when he arrived at the friend's house and

stopped his truck, "[t]he door came flying open[ and the daughter's] things got

thrown into the truck . . . ." Plaintiff testified that his foot was hanging out of

the door of the truck when he turned to see defendant, who allegedly slammed

the door on his foot. He stated that he attempted to go to the gym a few days

later but could not walk or run and that there was bruising on the top part of his

foot and ankle. He produced a photo of the top of his foot.

Plaintiff also testified about the incident involving defendant taking their

daughter to the beach rather than having her ready for his parenting time and

about defendant later appearing at his house when he was not at home without

A-0691-17T3
5
notifying him. Over defendant's attorney's objection, plaintiff also testified to

the contents of allegedly harassing texts that defendant sent to him. He stated

that generally, she "beat [him] down with name calling."

According to plaintiff, after he obtained a TRO, he had less stress in his

life and was not being followed. He noted that he still was not sleeping well but

was seeking the FRO so that he could "have [his] well-being and [his] peace

back in . . . [his] life."

Defendant testified that she did not slam the door on his foot and re called

that the event took place during a mild hurricane. She said that she opened the

truck door and threw their daughter's things into plaintiff's lap and went back to

her car given the rain but never closed plaintiff's door. Defendant also testified

about the beach incident and explained that she did not actually take their

daughter to the beach but instead to a cousin's house during plaintiff's scheduled

parenting time because he said that he had to work late and would call her later

to arrange a pick-up but never did.

Defendant admitted to placing a GPS tracker on plaintiff's truck, not to

stalk him but because she was concerned for their daughter's safety. She alleged

that there were several instances where plaintiff was drinking and driving with

their daughter in the car that gave rise to her concerns and resulted in her

A-0691-17T3
6
surreptitiously installing the tracking device on his truck, and at times, changing

its battery while the vehicle was parked during the months before he discovered

it.

Judge Kamil placed his decision on the record, explaining why he was

denying an FRO against defendant. Addressing the parties' credibility, the judge

stated the following:

With regard to credibility, this court recognizes that this
is a divorce case that's been going on for a long time,
that these parties have been acrimonious. When you
look at the credibility . . . the only credible things here
is that there was a device on the vehicle and that she put
it on the vehicle.

....

I don't necessarily find one of these . . . [parties] more
credible than the other.

The judge turned to the proofs adduced during the trial and noted various

significant omissions in the evidence. Among the missing evidence were copies

of texts that plaintiff claimed defendant sent establishing that she was aware of

his location or any medical testimony or reports concerning plaintiff's alleged

depression or inability to sleep. According to the judge, any texts submitted had

nothing to do with stalking. As to the alleged foot injury, the judge found that

the photograph submitted by plaintiff depicted what "look[ed] like a normal foot

A-0691-17T3
7
with a [slight] red . . . abrasion [at] the . . . top of the ankle." Judge Kamil also

observed that any alleged harassing texts were sent "a number of years ago" and

in any event, plaintiff failed to provide specific dates or times of other instances

where he felt like defendant was harassing him.

Despite the deficiencies in plaintiff's proofs, the judge concluded that

plaintiff established the predicate act of stalking. Judge Kamil stated that,

if somebody . . . [has] concern[s] that people knew
about their whereabouts all the time, it might cause
emotional distress. It certainly might. And I think that
this complaint reaches the level of preponderance for
stalking. So, I find that the predicate act of stalking was
done . . . [and] I have to accept and give [plaintiff]
certain inferences with regard to . . . him checking his
phone . . . with Verizon and . . . with Apple as to what's
going on with his phone.

He added that defendant's conduct rose to the level of stalking because plaintiff

was being constantly surveilled and that the surveilling was prohibited conduct

under the PDVA.

Turning to the Silver factors, under the first prong, the judge again noted

"a reasonable person who thought they were being followed or monitored would

sustain some emotional distress . . . ." As to the second prong, Judge Kamil

explained that he had to conduct an analysis as to whether a restraining order

was required in light of previous domestic violence history, the existence of

A-0691-17T3
8
immediate danger to a person and property, financial circumstances of the

parties, the best interest of a child or victim, custody implications, and the

existence of another jurisdiction's order of protection.

The judge found no previous history of domestic violence and did not find

that the incident involving the alleged slamming of the truck door rose to the

level of an assault. Further, he did not find plaintiff's allegations that he was

being harassed to be credible. He also did not find a history of physical abuse

against plaintiff or the existence of immediate danger to him or his property.

The judge stated that while defendant should not have put a tracking device on

plaintiff's truck, there was no evidence that she did anything beyond that in

attempt to monitor their child.

The judge concluded by explaining that although he found that defendant

committed an act of stalking,3 plaintiff did not prove that an FRO was necessary.

3
The elements of the stalking offense are stated in N.J.S.A. 2C:12-10, which
states in pertinent part the following:

a. As used in this act:

(1) "Course of conduct" means repeatedly maintaining
a visual or physical proximity to a person; directly,
indirectly, or through third parties, by any action,
method, device, or means, following, monitoring,
observing, surveilling, threatening, or communicating

A-0691-17T3
9
He stated that he did not "find by any other evidence and testimony, credible

testimony, that a restraining order [was] necessary to protect the victim from

immediate danger or [to] prevent further abuse . . . ." This appeal followed.

Plaintiff argues on appeal that Judge Kamil misapplied the legal standard

under Silver when determining whether an FRO should be granted. We find no

merit to his contention.

to or about, a person, or interfering with a person's
property; repeatedly committing harassment against a
person; or repeatedly conveying, or causing to be
conveyed, verbal or written threats or threats conveyed
by any other means of communication or threats
implied by conduct or a combination thereof directed at
or toward a person.

(2) "Repeatedly" means on two or more occasions.

(3) "Emotional distress" means significant mental
suffering or distress.

(4) "Cause a reasonable person to fear" means to cause
fear which a reasonable victim, similarly situated,
would have under the circumstances.

b. A person is guilty of stalking, a crime of the fourth
degree, if he purposefully or knowingly engages in a
course of conduct directed at a specific person that
would cause a reasonable person to fear for his safety
or the safety of a third person or suffer other emotional
distress.

[N.J.S.A. 2C:12-10.]
A-0691-17T3
10
We accord "great deference to discretionary decisions of Family Part

judges" given the "family courts' special jurisdiction and expertise in family

matters." G.M. v. C.V., 453 N.J. Super. 1, 11 (App. Div. 2018) (first quoting

Milne v. Goldenberg, 428 N.J. Super. 184, 197 (App. Div. 2012); and then

quoting N.J. Div. of Youth and Family Servs. v. M.C. III, 201 N.J. 328, 343

(2010)). When reviewing "a trial court's order entered following trial in a

domestic violence matter, we grant substantial deference to the trial court 's

findings of fact and the legal conclusions based upon those findings." D.N. v.

K.M., 429 N.J. Super. 592, 596 (App. Div. 2013). We do "not disturb the 'factual

findings and legal conclusions of the trial judge unless [we are] convinced that

they are so manifestly unsupported by or inconsistent with the competent,

relevant and reasonably credible evidence as to offend the interests of justice.'"

Cesare v. Cesare, 154 N.J. 394, 412 (1998) (quoting Rova Farms Resort, Inc. v.

Inv'rs Ins. Co., 65 N.J. 474, 484 (1974)). Deference is particularly appropriate

when the evidence is testimonial and involves credibility issues because the

judge who observes the witnesses and hears the testimony has a perspective that

the reviewing court does not enjoy. Pascale v. Pascale, 113 N.J. 20, 33 (1988).

The PDVA defines domestic violence by referring to a list of predicate

offenses found within the New Jersey Criminal Code. J.D. v. M.D.F., 207 N.J.

A-0691-17T3
11
458, 473 (2011). "[T]he commission of a predicate act, if the plaintiff meets the

definition of a 'victim of domestic violence,' constitutes domestic violence . . . ."

Ibid. (quoting N.J.S.A. 2C:25-19(d)).

In determining whether to issue an FRO, the court first must determine

whether the plaintiff has established by a preponderance of the evidence that the

defendant has committed a predicate act of domestic violence as defined in

N.J.S.A. 2C:25-19(a). Silver, 387 N.J. Super. at 125. The court also must

determine, by considering the factors enumerated in N.J.S.A. 2C:25-29(a)(1) to

(6),4 whether an FRO is necessary "to protect the victim from an immediate

4
The factors are:

(1) The previous history of domestic violence between
the plaintiff and defendant, including threats,
harassment and physical abuse;

(2) The existence of immediate danger to person or
property;

(3) The financial circumstances of the plaintiff and
defendant;

(4) The best interests of the victim and any child;

(5) In determining custody and parenting time the
protection of the victim's safety; and

A-0691-17T3
12
danger or to prevent further abuse." Id. at 127; see also A.M.C. v. P.B., 447 N.J.

Super. 402, 414 (App. Div. 2016).

"Commission of a predicate act is necessary, but alone insufficient, to

trigger relief provided by the [PDVA]." R.G. v. R.G., 449 N.J. Super. 208, 228

(App. Div. 2017). The mere finding of a predicate act of domestic violence,

standing alone, is insufficient to support the issuance of an FRO. Kamen v.

Egan, 322 N.J. Super. 222, 227 (App. Div. 1999).

As we have stated in other opinions:

The law mandates that acts claimed by a plaintiff to be
domestic violence must be evaluated in light of the
previous history of domestic violence between the
plaintiff and defendant including previous threats,
harassment and physical abuse and in light of whether
immediate danger to the person or property is present.
N.J.S.A. 2C:25-29(a)(1) and (2). This requirement
reflects the reality that domestic violence is ordinarily
more than an isolated aberrant act and incorporates the
legislative intent to provide a vehicle to protect victims
whose safety is threatened. This is the backdrop on
which defendant's acts must be evaluated.

[R.G., 449 N.J. Super. at 228-29 (quoting Corrente v.
Corrente, 281 N.J. Super. 243, 248 (App. Div. 1995)).]

(6) The existence of a verifiable order of protection
from another jurisdiction.

[ N.J.S.A. 2C:25-29(a)(1) to (6).]
A-0691-17T3
13
Applying these guiding principles, we conclude that Judge Kamil's denial

of an FRO was appropriate in this case. The judge properly performed his

obligation under Silver and considered all of the statutory factors. His finding

that an FRO was not necessary to protect plaintiff from an immediate danger or

to prevent further abuse was supported by a lack of substantial credible evidence

in the record that an FRO was needed for that purpose.

Affirmed.

Thursday, September 5, 2019

DV statute could apply to former nanny E.S., v. C.DDV statute could apply to former nanny E.S., v. C.D

DV statute could apply to former nanny

E.S.,

v. C.D
,1

Plaintiff,
Defendant.

Decided: December 24, 2018 E.S., plaintiff, pro se.
C.D., defendant, did not appear. STEINHART, J.S.C.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED WITHOUT
THE APPROVAL OF THE COMMITTEE ON OPINIONS
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY BERGEN COUNTY
CHANCERY DIVISION, FAMILY PART DOCKET NO. FV-02-1094-19

This matter comes before the court by way of a hearing for a final restraining order under the Prevention of Domestic Violence Act (PDVA). N.J.S.A. 2C:25-17 to -35. The issue is whether plaintiff is a party entitled to protection under the PDVA, given the parties’ economic relationship. Plaintiff
1 The parties’ initials have been used to protect their privacy. R. 1:38- 3(d)(10).

APPROVED FOR PUBLICATION July 15, 2019 COMMITTEE ON OPINIONS

has alleged that defendant committed the predicate acts of harassment, cyber- harassment and terroristic threats.
Defendant was employed as a full time nanny in plaintiff’s householdfrom March 2018 until October 2018. Defendant was fired from her position in October 2018 for having assaulted plaintiff’s child. Moreover, plaintiff had discovered that defendant had applied for the nanny position using an alias. For weeks after being discharged, defendant made numerous telephone calls, and sent threatening and harassing text messages to plaintiff.
The PDVA defines victims of domestic violence to include any person eighteen years or older who has been subjected to domestic violence by aperson who “was at any time a household member.” N.J.S.A. 2C:25-19(d). Coleman v. Romano, 388 N.J. Super. 342, 351-52 (Ch. Div. 2006), lists six considerations to determine whether the parties qualify as household members for purposes of the PDVA: 1) the nature and duration of the prior relationship; 2) whether the past domestic violence relationship provided a special opportunity for abuse and controlling behavior; 3) the passage of time since the end of the relationship; 4) the extent and nature of any intervening contacts; 5) the nature of the precipitating incident; and 6) the likelihood of ongoing contact or relationship.
As a nanny under the circumstances of this case, defendant had no right to or expectation of a continued relationship with the child and/or plaintiff

after their professional relationship was terminated. However, it was not the nanny who was victimized. Defendant had resided in plaintiff’s home forseven months with plaintiff and plaintiff’s child. That defendant wasemployed as the child’s nanny provided her with insight into the child’s natureand to that of plaintiff, rendering plaintiff and the child vulnerable todefendant’s personal attacks. For example, defendant threatened to fabricatethe truth to the child’s father in an effort to cause plaintiff to lose custody ofthe child.
Only two months had passed since defendant left plaintiff’s householdafter being discharged. The threats and harassment occurred after defendant was discharged. There was no intervening act after defendant left the household that would have given cause for any exacerbation of defendant’s actions. Defendant threatened and harassed plaintiff after their relationship, albeit an economic one, terminated. Moreover, the likelihood of contact has been heightened over the twelve years since the Coleman decision, in light of the use and popularity of cell phones, texting and social media.
In S.Z. v. M.C., 417 N.J. Super. 622 (App. Div. 2011), a male guest who lived with the plaintiff for seven months was considered a household member for purposes of the PDVA, despite the absence of a traditional familial, sexual or romantic relationship. The defendant in S.Z. was employed as a bookkeeperfor the plaintiff’s renovation business and needed a place to live. Id. at 623.

This is not dissimilar to the matter at hand, in which defendant resided inplaintiff’s home to accommodate her employment as the child’s nanny. That a person receives a monetary benefit from engaging in a relationship does not automatically disqualify that person from seeking relief under the PDVA. J.S. v. J.F., 410 N.J. Super. 611, 615 (App. Div. 2009). Analogously, that a victim had provided an economic benefit to a defendant should not automatically disqualify the victim from seeking relief under the PDVA.
Victims of domestic violence come from all social and economic backgrounds. It was the intent of the legislature that victims of domestic violence are afforded the maximum protection from abuse the law can provide. N.J.S.A. 2C:25-18. Notwithstanding the economic relationship of the parties, plaintiff and defendant are former household members. As such, plaintiff is a protected party under the PDVA.

Directive #13-19 Denial of a Domestic Violence Temporary Restraining Order

Directive #13-19[Questions may be directed to the Municipal Division at 609-815-2900 ext. 54850 or the Family Practice Division at 609-815-2900 ext. 55350]

Glenn A. Grant, J . A . D ~Denial of a Domestic Violence Temporary Restraining Order

Date: July 10, 2019

This Directive promulgates the protocol, as approved by the Supreme Court, to be employed when a plaintiff seeks an Immediate De Novo Hearing for the denial of a domestic violence Temporary Restraining Order/Complaint (TRO) by the Municipal Court.

Currently, victims of domestic violence can make an application for a TRO in the Municipal Courts when the Superior Court is closed. However, if the victim requests a de novo review of the Municipal Court denial, the victim must wait until the Superior Court is open for business. The safety of a domestic violence victim is always of utmost concern, and during a weekend or holiday, a victim may wait two to three days for a de novo hearing. Therefore, effective October 1, 2019, if the victim requests an immediate de novo review for the denial of a TRO, the following procedure must be employed:

The Municipal Court judge must advise the victim, on the record, that the victim has the right to an immediate review of the TRO denial to an on-call Superior Court judge.
If the victim wishes to exercise this right, law enforcement shall contact an on- call Superior Court judge.
This on-call Superior Court judge will review the same TRO/Complaint that was presented·to the Municipal judge.
The Superior Court judge will conduct a hearing on the TRO/Complaint telephonically and make a decision whether to grant or deny the TRO as outlined in the Domestic Violence Procedures Manual (DVPM).

From:
Subject: Municipal/Family - Immediate De Novo Hearing for the Municipal Court

Richard J. Hughes Justice Complex O P.O. Box 037 ° Trenton, New Jersey 08625-0037

Tuesday, September 3, 2019

How to Get a Restraining Order if married or were in dating in NJ

How to Get a Restraining Order if married or were in dating in NJ

If you are a victim of domestic violence, you may be able to get protection in the form of a temporary restraining order that can later become final. A restraining order is a civil order from the Family Part of the Superior Court. It prohibits the abuser from having any contact with you, including over the telephone, in person, or electronically. That means no phone calls, text messages, or e-mails.

Who qualifies for a domestic violence restraining order?

You can get a domestic violence restraining order if:

Regardless of your age, you are having or did have a dating relationship with an abuser over the age of 18.
You are or were married to the abuser.
You share child(ren) with the abuser.
One of you is pregnant.
You are over 18 and are currently living with or previously lived with the abuser.

Also, to qualify for a temporary restraining order, the abuser must have done something that meets the definition of at least one the following crimes: harassment, assault, terroristic threats, criminal mischief, kidnapping, burglary, sexual assault, criminal sexual contact, false imprisonment, criminal restraint, criminal trespass, lewdness, stalking, homicide, robbery, criminal coercion, cyber-harassment, violation of a restraining order, or any crime involving risk of death or serious bodily injury. The person you file a restraining order against must be at least 18 years old

Source https://www.lsnjlaw.org/Family-Relationships/Domestic-Violence/Get-Restraining-Order/Pages/Get-Restraining-Order.aspx

Help through the courts

Victims of domestic violence may get help through the courts. A victim who has been in a violent relationship and feels unsafe may be able to take steps to keep the abuser away by filing a restraining order. A judge may grant a restraining order if the victim proves that he or she has been subjected to one of the 19 crimes set forth in the New Jersey Prevention of Domestic Violence Act (N.J.S.A 2C:33 et al.) and is in need of the protections of that order.

The explanations below are only interpretations of New Jersey’s criminal statutes. To better understand each crime, you may look up the New Jersey statutes listed in parentheses by the name of each crime. If you think you have been a victim of any of these crimes, you should contact an attorney or your local domestic violence agency.

Harassment (N.J.S.A. 2C:33-4)

In order to commit the crime of harassment, a person must intend to harass another person. An example of harassment is where someone communicates with you at inconvenient hours or uses rude and profane language. A person may harass you by using email, regular mail, phone calls, texting, face-to-face communications, or any other way that sends a message from the abuser to you. The communication must annoy or alarm you.

A person may also be guilty of harassment if that person contacts you in an offensive way. Offensive contact includes acts that are annoying, insulting, or embarrassing to you, such as hitting, kicking, pushing, and touching. This type of act may be considered to be harassment whether or not you have been injured. Threatening to do any of these acts may also be considered harassment.

If someone does things that are meant to scare or seriously annoy you, and these actions are repeated, that person may also be guilty of harassment.

Assault (N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1)

The most common example of an assault is when an abuser hits a victim. An abuser may harm a victim or try to harm a victim. The harm may be done with or without a deadly weapon. If an abuser threatens to harm you, this may also be considered an assault. For example, an abuser may knowingly have threatened you with a gun, whether or not it was loaded, and may not have cared that you could have been hurt. In any of these cases, an abuser may be guilty of assault.

In cases where you have actually been harmed, you must feel a sensation of pain for it to be an assault. It does not have to be very painful—it can be as simple as the sting felt when someone slaps you.

Terroristic threats (N.J.S.A. 2C:12-3)

An abuser who threatens to commit any violent crime with the purpose of terrorizing you may be guilty of terroristic threats. An abuser may also be guilty of terroristic threats if the abuser threatens to kill you or someone else and you believe that the abuser can and will do it. A conditional threat (“If you do X, then I will kill you.”) may not meet the standard for a terroristic threat.

Criminal mischief (N.J.S.A. 2C:17-3)

An abuser who breaks any of your belongings on purpose may be guilty of criminal mischief. The property that the abuser breaks must belong only to you. It cannot be property that you and the abuser own together. If an abuser tampers with your property in a way that puts you or your belongings in danger, the abuser may be guilty of criminal mischief. Common examples of criminal mischief include someone keying your car, punching a hole in the wall of your home, or breaking your cell phone.

Criminal restraint (N.J.S.A. 2C:13-2)

An abuser who keeps you in a place that puts you at risk of serious bodily injury or keeps you somewhere and will not allow you to leave may be guilty of criminal restraint. For example, if you are locked in a room and the abuser begins attacking you, that is criminal restraint. Serious bodily injury means any injury that could be deadly or cause long-term disability. Criminal restraint may also exist if you are subjected to a life of servitude against your will.

False imprisonment (N.J.S.A. 2C:13-3)

If an abuser is keeping you somewhere you do not want to be and will not let you go, the abuser may be guilty of false imprisonment. False imprisonment is different from criminal restraint in that false imprisonment does not require risk of serious bodily injury. For example, if a woman is restrained from leaving a particular area because of an abuser’s actions but is not injured in any way, the abuser may be found guilty of false imprisonment, not criminal restraint.

Burglary (N.J.S.A. 2C:18-2)

Burglary may be committed in two ways. If someone breaks into a house or other secured building and has the intent to commit a crime inside, that person’s actions may be considered to be burglary. If a person secretly hides out in a house or other secured building without permission to be there with the intent to commit a crime inside that house or building, that person may have committed an act of burglary.

Criminal sexual contact (N.J.S.A. 2C:14-1, 2C:14-3)

A person who uses force or coercion (such as bullying or threatening violence) to have sexual contact with another person may be guilty of criminal sexual contact. Without freely given consent to the sexual activity, the contact may be considered to be by force or coercion. Criminal sexual contact may also include situations where the abuser physically overpowers the victim. Sexual contact is defined as intentionally touching the victim’s thigh, groin, buttocks, or breast without the victim’s consent. The abuser must be doing this for personal sexual pleasure or to humiliate or degrade the victim.

Sexual assault (N.J.S.A. 2C:14-1, 2C:14-2)

Sexual assault is any instance where an abuser uses force or coercion to sexually penetrate another person. Force or coercion may mean a time where the victim does not provide freely given consent to the sexual activity but may also include the abuser physically overpowering the victim. Sexual penetration means vaginal sex, anal sex, oral sex, or putting fingers or objects into the vagina or anus. It does not matter if the penetration was done by the abuser personally or if the abuser ordered the victim to commit the penetration.

Kidnapping (N.J.S.A. 2C:13-1)

Kidnapping is when an abuser takes a victim from where he or she is presently located to another location. To commit a kidnapping, it must be done by force, threat, or deception. Kidnapping may be defined as the act of an abuser confining a victim as a hostage or for ransom. Kidnapping may also be defined as when an abuser keeps a victim somewhere for a long time to hurt or scare the victim.

Stalking (N.J.S.A. 2C:12-10, 2C:12-10.1)

A person is a stalker if that person, more than once, stares at another person for a long time, follows someone or sends other people to follow someone, interferes with the belongings of another person, harasses another person, or sends threats in any way to another person. The stalker must have done any of these actions on purpose or must have known that it was likely to make the victim feel scared or uncomfortable. A stalker may also stalk another person in order to scare you.

If an abuser is convicted of stalking in criminal court, the victim may receive a separate criminal restraining order. Parents may file a complaint for a restraining order based on stalking on behalf of their children.

Lewdness (N.J.S.A. 2C:14-4)

Lewdness is when a person does something “flagrantly lewd and offensive” in front of another person who would not want to see the offensive act. A common example of this is a person who exposes his or her private parts for their own gratification to a non-consenting person.

Criminal trespass (N.J.S.A. 2C:18-3)

If someone enters or hides out in a house or other building and does not have permission to be there, that person may be guilty of criminal trespass. The person must also know that he or she needed permission or did not have permission to be there.

Some places will not allow people to enter. There might be a guard keeping people out of a building or part of a building, a sign telling people not to enter, or a fence or locked door blocking people from entering. If a person ignores restrictions such as signs, locked doors, fences, or a security guard and enters anyway, that person may be guilty of criminal trespass.

There are times when people do not expect to have anyone watching them, such as when they are sleeping or in the bathroom. If someone is peeking in through windows to watch another person in a home and the person being watched did not reasonably expect to be watched, the person peeking may also be guilty of criminal trespass.

Homicide (N.J.S.A. 2C:11-1 to 2C:11-4)

Homicide is the crime of one person causing the death of another person. An attempted homicide may be part of a final restraining order hearing.

Criminal Coercion (N.J.S.A. 2C:13-5)

Criminal coercion means that someone tries to make you do something or tries to stop you from doing something by threatening you that s/he will: hurt you or someone else, commit a crime, accuse someone else of committing a crime, expose a secret that would damage your reputation or your credit, testify or not testify in court, or do something to damage your health, safety, career, or personal relationships. Criminal coercion is more than just a threat. The threat must be connected to trying to force you into doing something.

Robbery (N.J.S.A. 2C:15-1)

Robbery occurs when someone steals something from you while at the same time hurting you, threatening to hurt you, using force, or committing or threatening to commit certain other crimes.

Contempt of a domestic violence restraining order (N.J.S.A. 2C:29-9)

If you already have a temporary restraining order or a final restraining order and the defendant/abuser calls, emails, texts, shows up at your home or work, or in any way contacts you, that is a violation of the restraining order. The violation should result in the arrest of the defendant. In the case of a temporary restraining order, the violation would allow you to go to court to amend (add information to) the temporary restraining order by including contempt of a domestic violence order as an additional crime for the court to consider in the trial for the final restraining order.

Cyber-harassment (N.J.S.A. 2C:15-1)

Cyber-harassment is when someone threatens online to harm you or your property or someone else or their property. It is also when someone posts, comments, requests, suggests or proposes any “indecent” or “obscene” material about you with the intent to emotionally harm you or place you in fear of physical or emotional harm. If someone uses Facebook, Instagram, Snapchat or another online forum to threaten you with harm or if someone posts intimate photographs of you online or threatens to do so, they may be committing cyber-harassment.

Any other crime involving risk of death or serious bodily injury

If someone has committed a crime against you that involves risk of death or serious bodily injury, that may constitute an act of domestic violence. Arson and neglect of an elderly person are two examples of crimes that may put someone at risk of death of serious bodily injury.

Source https://www.lsnjlaw.org/Family-Relationships/Domestic-Violence/Domestic-Violence-Overview/Pages/19-Crimes-of-DV.aspx

A restraining order can either be filed in the county where the parties live or the county where the domestic violence occurred.

In the evening and weekends, if assaulted call police and also ask to be connected with the court. If need to obtain a TRO right away and it is a weekend, holiday, or after-hours, you can go to your local police department, the police department where your abuser lives, or where the abuse occurred.

If not emergent in Middlesex County, NJ, you can file for a TRO at Middlesex County Family Courthouse Domestic Violence Intake Office located at 120 New Street, New Brunswick, NJ, 08901, Monday through Friday from 8:30 am to 3:30 pm.

Family Intake Reception Team

Family Courthouse

120 New Street

New Brunswick, NJ 08901

(732) 645-4300 Ext: 88530

(732) 645-4283

(Mailing Address)

Family Intake Reception Team

P.O. Box 2691

New Brunswick, NJ 08903-2691