N.J.S. 2C:25 – 27(C)     DOMESTIC VIOLENCE                        

(1) When a defendant is found guilty of a crime or offense involving domestic violence, the court shall inform the defendant that the defendant is prohibited from purchasing, owning, possessing, or controlling a firearm pursuant to N.J.S. 2C:39-7 and from receiving or retaining a firearms purchaser identification card or permit to purchase a handgun pursuant to N.J.S. 2C:58-3. The court shall order the defendant to arrange for the immediate surrender to a law enforcement officer of any firearm that has not already been seized or surrendered and any firearms purchaser identification card or permit to purchase a handgun possessed by the defendant. No later than five business days after the order is entered, however, the defendant may arrange to sell any surrendered firearm to a licensed retail dealer of firearms who shall be authorized to take possession of that purchased firearm from the law enforcement agency to which it was surrendered no later than 10 business days after the order is entered. Any card or permit issued to the defendant shall be deemed immediately revoked. The court shall establish a process for notifying the appropriate authorities of the conviction requiring the revocation of the card or permit. A law enforcement officer accepting a surrendered firearm shall provide the defendant with a receipt listing the date of surrender, the name of the defendant, and any item that has been surrendered, including the serial number, manufacturer, and model of the surrendered firearm. The defendant shall provide a copy of this receipt to the prosecutor within 48 hours of service of the order, and shall attest under penalty that any firearms owned or possessed at the time of the order have been transferred in accordance with this section and that the defendant currently does not possess any firearms. The defendant alternatively may attest under penalty that he did not own or possess a firearm at the time of the order and currently does not possess a firearm. If the court, upon motion of the prosecutor, finds probable cause that the defendant has failed to surrender any firearm, card, or permit, the court may order a search for and removal of these items at any location where the judge has reasonable cause to believe these items are located. The judge shall state with specificity the reasons for and the scope of the search and seizure authorized by the order.

(2) A law enforcement officer who receives a firearm that is surrendered, but not purchased and taken possession of by a licensed retail dealer of firearms within 10 business days of when the order is entered pursuant to paragraph (1) of this subsection, may dispose of the surrendered firearm in accordance with the provisions of N.J.S.2C:64-6. A firearm purchased by a licensed retail dealer from a defendant shall become part of the inventory of the dealer.

Woodbridge Library Wills, Estate Planning & Probate Seminar November 20

Woodbridge Library

Wills, Estate Planning & Probate Seminar

November 20 at 7pm

  Woodbridge Public Library

1 George Frederick Plaza

Woodbridge NJ 07095 

       WILLS & ESTATE ADMINISTRATION-PROTECT YOUR FAMILY AND MAKE PLANNING EASY

     SPEAKER: Kenneth Vercammen, Esq. Edison, NJ (Author- Wills and Estate Administration by the ABA)

     Main Topics:

 1. 2017 changes to NJ Estate Tax & changes to taxes on pensions

2. Updates in Federal Estate and Gift Tax 

3. The New Probate Law and preparation of Wills   

4. Why a new Power of Attorney is important 

5.  Living Wills             

6.  Administering the Estate/ Probate/Surrogate   

COMPLIMENTARY MATERIAL: Brochures on Wills, "Answers to Questions about Probate" and Administration of an Estate, Power of

Attorney, Living Wills, Real Estate Sales for Seniors, and Trusts.

     Woodbridge Public Library 732-634-4450

1 George Frederick Plaza

Woodbridge NJ 07095 

     akane@woodbridgelibrary.org

www.facebook.com/events/1922785324675534

    Free Will Seminars and Speakers Bureau for Groups

       

        10 years ago the AARP Network Attorneys of the Edison/Metuchen/Woodbridge area several years ago established a community Speakers Bureau to provide educational programs to AARP and senior clubs, Unions and Middlesex County companies. Now, Ken Vercammen, Esq. and volunteer attorneys of the Middlesex County Estate Planning Council have provided Legal Rights Seminars to hundreds of seniors, business owners and their employees, unions, clubs and non-profit groups. For additional information on the Legal Seminars, contact our Coordinator, Kenneth Vercammen's law office at (732) 572-0500, email VercammenLaw@njlaws.com 

Details on free programs available

These quality daytime educational programs will educate and even entertain. Clubs and companies are invited to schedule a free seminar. The following Seminars are now available:

1. WILLS & ESTATE ADMINISTRATION-PROTECT YOUR FAMILY AND

MAKE PLANNING EASY

2. POWER OF ATTORNEY to permit family to pay your bills if you are temporarily disabled and permit doctors to talk with family

       All instructors are licensed attorneys who have been in practice at least 25 years. All instructors are members of the American Bar Association, New Jersey

State Bar Association, and Middlesex County Bar Association. All programs include free written materials.

       You don't have to be wealthy or near death to do some thinking about a Will. Here is your opportunity to listen to an experienced attorney who will discuss how to distribute your property as you wish and avoid many rigid provisions of state law.

      Topics discussed include: Who needs a Will?; What if you die without a Will (intestacy)?; Mechanics of a Will; "Living Will"; Powers of Attorney; Selecting an executor, trustee, and guardian; Proper Will execution; Inheritance Taxes, Estate Taxes  14,000 annual gift tax exclusion,  Bequests to charity, Why you need a "Self-Proving" Will and  Estate Administration/ Probate.

       Sample materials: Hand-outs on Wills, Living Wills/Medical Advance Directive, Power of Attorney, Probate and Administration of an Estate, Real Estate, Working with your Attorney, Consumers Guide to New Jersey Laws, and Senior Citizen Rights.

SPEAKERS BUREAU

        At the request of senior citizen groups, unions, and Middlesex County companies and organizations, the " Speakers Bureau " is a service designed to educate citizens about how laws affect their lives and how the judicial system operates. We have attorneys available to speak to businesspersons, educational, civic and social organizations on a wide range of topics during business hours.

In today's complex world, few people can function successfully and safely without competent legal advice. In order to insure your estate plans are legally set up, you need to know exactly where you stand so that you can avoid possibly catastrophic mistakes impacting both you and your family.

About the speaker: Kenneth A. Vercammen is a trial attorney in Edison, NJ. We is the author of the American Bar Association’s book “Wills and Estate Administration”

He is co-chair of the ABA Probate & Estate Planning Law Committee of the American Bar Association Solo Small Firm Division.  He is a speaker for the NJ State Bar Association at the annual Nuts & Bolts of Elder Law & Estate Administration program.

He was Editor of the ABA Estate Planning Probate Committee Newsletter. Mr. Vercammen has published over 150 legal articles in national and New Jersey publications on litigation, elder law, probate and trial topics. He is a highly regarded lecturer on litigation and probate law for the American Bar Association, NJ ICLE, New Jersey State Bar Association and Middlesex County Bar Association. His articles have been published in noted publications included New Jersey Law Journal, ABA Law Practice Management Magazine, and New Jersey Lawyer. He established the NJlaws website www.njlaws.com which includes many articles on Estate Planning, Probate and Wills. He is a member of the AARP and often lectures to groups on the importance of an up to date Will, Power of Attorney and Living Will.

 KENNETH  VERCAMMEN & ASSOCIATES, PC

ATTORNEY AT LAW

2053 Woodbridge Ave.

Edison, NJ 08817

(Phone) 732-572-0500

 (Fax)    732-572-0030

www.njlaws.com

Rule 5:6-9. Termination of Child Support Obligations new court rule with termination on age 19

Rule 5:6-9. Termination of Child Support Obligations new court rule with termination on age 19

(a) Duration of Support. In accordance with N.J.S.A. 2A:17-56.67 et seq., unless otherwise provided in a court order, judgment, or preexisting agreement, the obligation to pay current child support, including health care coverage, shall terminate by operation of law when the child being supported: 

(1) dies; 

(2) marries; 

(3) enters the military service; or 

(4) reaches 19 years of age, except as otherwise provided within this rule. 

In no case shall a child support obligation extend beyond the date the child reaches the age of 23.

(b) Termination of Obligation in Cases Administered by the Probation Division. 

(1) Notices of Proposed Termination. Where no other emancipation date or termination has been ordered by the court, the Probation Division shall send the obligor and obligee notice of proposed termination of child support prior to the child reaching 19 years of age in accordance with N.J.S.A. 2A:17-56.67 et seq. Notices shall contain the proposed termination date and information for the obligee to submit a written request for continuation of support beyond the date the child reaches 19 years of age. 

(2) Written Request for Continuation. In response to the notice prescribed in section (1), the obligee may submit to the court a written request for continuation, on a form and within timeframes promulgated by the Administrative Office of the Courts, with supporting documentation and a future termination date, seeking the continuation of support beyond the child’s nineteenth birthday if the child being supported: 

(A) is still enrolled in high school or other secondary educational program; 

(B) is enrolled full-time in a post-secondary educational program; or 

(C) has a physical or mental disability as determined by a federal or state agency that existed prior to the child reaching the age of 19 and requires continued support. 

(3) Review of Written Request for Continuation. The Probation Division shall review the obligee’s written request and documentation and shall make recommendation to the court as to whether the support obligation will continue beyond the child’s nineteenth birthday. If sufficient proof has been provided, the court shall issue an order to both parties establishing the future termination date. If sufficient proof has not been provided, the court shall issue an order to both parties terminating the current support obligation as of the date of the child’s nineteenth birthday. No additional notice need be provided to the parties. 

(4) No Response to Notice of Proposed Termination. If the Probation Division receives no response to the notices of proposed termination of child support, the court shall issue an order to both parties establishing the termination of obligation as of the child’s nineteenth birthday. No additional notice need be provided to the parties. 

(5) Motion or Application. If a party disagrees with the termination or continuation order entered, the party may file a motion in a dissolution matter or an application in a non-dissolution or domestic violence matter requesting either termination or continuation of the child support obligation, as applicable. 

(6) Arrears Remain Due and Enforceable. Any arrearages accrued prior to the date of termination shall remain due and enforceable by the Probation Division as appropriate until either they are paid in full or the court terminates the Probation Division’s supervision of the support order. Upon termination of an obligation to pay current support, the amount to be paid to satisfy the arrearage shall be the sum of the obligation amount in effect immediately prior to the termination plus any arrears repayment amount if there are no other children remaining on the support order. 

(7) Notice of Termination. Where an emancipation date or termination date has been ordered by the court, the Probation Division shall send the obligor and obligee 

notice of termination of child support prior to the child reaching the court ordered emancipation date or future termination date in accordance with N.J.S.A. 2A:17-56.67 et seq. Such notice shall contain the date on which child support shall terminate and information regarding the adjustments that will be made to the obligation, as applicable. 

(8) Unallocated Orders. Whenever there is an unallocated child support order for two or more children and the obligation to pay support for one or more of the children is terminated pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2A:17-56.67 et seq., the amount to be paid prior to the termination shall remain in effect for the other children. Either party may file a motion in a dissolution matter or an application in a non-dissolution or domestic violence matter to adjust the support amount. 

(9) Allocated Orders. Whenever there is an allocated child support order for two or more children and the obligation to pay support for one or more of the children is terminated pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2A:17-56.67 et seq., the amount to be paid shall be adjusted to reflect the reduction of the terminated obligation(s) for the other children. Either party may file a motion in a dissolution matter or an application in a non-dissolution or domestic violence matter to adjust the support amount. 

(c) Termination or Continuation of Child Support Obligations Not Administered by the Probation Division. Where an obligor has been ordered to pay child support directly to the obligee, the child support obligation shall terminate by operation of law in accordance with N.J.S.A. 2A:17-56.67 et seq., unless otherwise provided in a court order or judgment. Notwithstanding any other provision of law, a party may file a motion in a dissolution matter or an application in a non-dissolution or domestic violence matter requesting termination or continuation of a child support obligation at any time, for good cause. The Probation Division shall not be required to provide any noticing, monitoring or enforcement services in any case where the obligor has been ordered to pay child support directly to the obligee. 

(d) Other Reasons for Termination of Child Support Obligations. A party to a child support order, at any time, may file a motion in a dissolution matter or an application in a non-dissolution or domestic violence matter requesting termination of a child support obligation based on good cause. Any arrearages accrued prior to the date of termination shall remain due and enforceable by the obligee or the Probation Division, as appropriate. 

(e) Emancipation. Except as otherwise provided by these rules, and in accordance with N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23, N.J.S.A. 2A:17-56.67 et seq., and related case law, a party to a child support order at any time may file a motion in a dissolution matter or an application in a non-dissolution or domestic violence matter requesting emancipation of a child. Court-ordered emancipation shall terminate the obligation of an obligor to pay current child support, as of the effective date set forth in the order of emancipation. Any arrearages accrued prior to the date of emancipation shall remain due and enforceable by the obligee or the Probation Division, as appropriate. 

(f) Support for Children in Out-of-Home Placement through the Division of Child Protection and Permanency. A child support obligation payable to the Division of Child Protection and Permanency (DCP&P) for children in an out-of-home placement shall not be terminated by operation of law upon the child turning 19 years of age. A child 

support obligation payable to DCP&P shall terminate upon notification that the child is no longer in placement or upon the child turning 23 years of age, whichever occurs first. 

(g) Financial Maintenance for a Child Beyond 23 Years of Age. Pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23, N.J.S.A. 2A:17-56.67 et seq., and related case law: 

(1) a child beyond 23 years of age may apply to the court for an order requiring the payment of financial maintenance or reimbursement from a parent; 

(2) a parent, or a child over the age of 23, may apply to the court for an order converting a child support obligation to another form of financial maintenance in exceptional circumstances, including but not limited to the child’s physical or mental disability that existed prior to the date that the child reached the age of 23; 

(3) Any arrearages accrued prior to the date of termination or conversion shall remain due and enforceable by the obligee or Probation Division, as appropriate; and 

(4) Court-ordered financial maintenance or reimbursement from a parent shall not be payable or enforceable as child support. The Probation Division shall not be required to provide any establishment, monitoring or enforcement of such maintenance or reimbursement order. 

(h) Foreign Orders or Judgments. The provisions of N.J.S.A. 2A:17-56.67 et seq. shall not apply to child support provisions contained in orders or judgments entered by a foreign jurisdiction and registered in New Jersey for modification or enforcement pursuant to the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act, N.J.S.A. 2A:4-30.124 et seq. 

Note: Adopted July 28, 2017 to be effective September 1, 2017

Evidence Rule 501 Spousal privilege

NJ Evidence Rule 501. Spousal privilege N.J.S.A. 2A:84A-17 provides: (1) Every person has in any criminal action in which he is an accused a right not to be called as a witness and not to testify. (2) The spouse or one partner in a civil union couple of the accused in a criminal action shall not testify in such action except to prove the fact of marriage or civil union unless (a) such spouse or partner consents, or (b) the accused is charged with an offense against the spouse or partner, a child of the accused or of the spouse or partner, or a child to whom the accused or the spouse or partner stands in the place of a parent, or (c) such spouse or partner is the complainant. 2C:12-1 Simple Assault & Aggravated assault 2C:12-1 . Assault. a. Simple assault. A person is guilty of assault if he: (1) Attempts to cause or purposely, knowingly or recklessly causes bodily injury to another; or (2) Negligently causes bodily injury to another with a deadly weapon; or (3) Attempts by physical menace to put another in fear of imminent serious bodily injury.

DV requires dating relationship or household members, not cousins

DV requires dating relationship or household members, not cousins

A.L.I.,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

D.W.,

Defendant-Respondent.

____________________________________

Submitted May 23, 2017 – Decided July 12, 2017

Before Judges Fisher and Vernoia.

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Chancery Division, Family Part, Morris County, Docket No. FV-14-0719-16.

FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R.1:36-3.

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-0 

PER CURIAM

Plaintiff A.L.I. appeals the dismissal of an action she commenced against her second cousin, defendant D.W., pursuant to the Prevention of Domestic Violence Act (the Act), N.J.S.A. 2C:25-17 to -35. The action was dismissed, at the conclusion of a four-day final hearing, because the trial judge found plaintiff was not a "victim of domestic violence," which, in relevant part, is defined in N.J.S.A. 2C:25-19(d) as a person who has been subjected to domestic violence by a person who "was at any time a household member." Based on his factual findings about the nature of the parties' relationship, to which we defer, Cesare v. Cesare, 154 N.J. 394, 410-11 (1998); D.N. v. K.M., 429 N.J. Super. 592, 596 (App. Div. 2013), certif. denied, 216 N.J. 587 (2014), we conclude the trial judge properly found plaintiff did not fit this statutory definition and we, therefore, affirm.

The Act's reach toward past household members has, at times, proved difficult for our courts. In considering the statute's prior language – which defined "victim of domestic violence" as including a person who has been subjected to domestic violence by "any person who is a present or former household member" – we rejected the Act's application to a dispute between adult siblings who lived together during their childhood but had "not resided together in the same household for twenty years." Jutchenko v. Jutchenko, 283 N.J. Super. 17, 20 (App. Div. 1995). We also recognized, when considering the former statutory language, that courts must look to determine whether the "perpetrator's past domestic relationship with the alleged victim provides a special opportunity for abusive and controlling behavior." Tribuzio v. Roder, 356 N.J. Super. 590, 595 (App. Div. 2003); see also N.G. v. J.P., 426 N.J. Super. 398, 409 (App. Div. 2012).

The case at hand arose after August 10, 2015, the effective date of the amended statute. See L. 2015, c. 98, § 2. Recently, we held that the new definition, which changed the phrase "former household member" to a person who "was at any time a household member," widened the net of cases falling within the Act's jurisdiction. R.G. v. R.G., 449 N.J. Super. 208, 210 (App. Div. 2017). Indeed, the new statutory language would seem to cover even the circumstance we found insufficient in Jutchenko. Notwithstanding this broader scope, the Act was not amended to include family relations that were never members of the same household, as here.

As noted above, the parties are second cousins. The events that precipitated this action commenced when, in December 2015, defendant stayed in the home of her cousin, plaintiff, and plaintiff's husband, for ten days. When defendant ended this visit, plaintiff's husband went with her and they began cohabiting. In February 2016, defendant and plaintiff's husband ended a trip to Florida and, on the way to plaintiff's home in Boonton, defendant made threatening and abusive phone calls to plaintiff. On February 22, 2016, both defendant and plaintiff's husband arrived at plaintiff's home. Defendant again spoke abusively toward plaintiff and physically attacked her, prompting plaintiff's filing of a complaint, which resulted in the issuance of a temporary restraining order on March 2, 2016.

A four-day trial occurred over the course of non-consecutive days in April, May and June 2016. At the conclusion of the hearing on June 20, 2016, the judge rendered an oral decision and concluded that the failure of the proofs to demonstrate plaintiff fell within N.J.S.A. 2C:25-19(d) required dismissal.¹ The family judge, however, stayed this final order pending "a resolution of plaintiff's appeal" – a ruling that presumably left in place the temporary restraining order.

Plaintiff appeals, arguing, in a single point, that "the scope and nature of the parties' relationship qualifies plaintiff as a 'victim'" as defined by N.J.S.A. 2C:25-19(d) "based on the remedial nature of the statute and the most expansive reading of the statute which seeks to prevent violence that occurs in a family or family[-]like settings." We disagree.

The judge correctly determined that plaintiff did not meet the definition of "victim of domestic violence." Although the judge applied the statute's prior iteration rather than the current version, the judge's findings, which are firmly grounded on the evidence deemed credible, demonstrate that the parties were never household members. They are second cousins. And, though they may have occasionally stayed under the same roof on visits to plaintiff's mother's condominium in Florida when they were young girls, or though they may have taken vacations together and had overnight visits in each other's home over the years, they were never, at any time, members of the same household.

Consequently, we reject the only argument posed by plaintiff in this appeal.

Affirmed.²

1  Despite finding a lack of jurisdiction due to his findings regarding the relationship between the parties, the judge also found, in greater detail, that – if there was a sufficient relationship – defendant engaged in domestic violence that would have warranted entry of a final restraining order.

2  The stay imposed by the trial judge will remain in effect for fourteen days from today's date unless plaintiff moves for the continuation of the stay pending a petition for certification, and, in that instance, the stay will remain in effect until there is a ruling on that motion.

No tro if no fear J.L.M. v. J.W.,

No tro if no fear
 J.L.M. v. J.W., N.J. Super. App. Div. (per curiam) (12 pp.) Defendant appealed the entry of a final restraining order in favor of plaintiff, after the trial court found that defendant committed the predicate act of harassment against plaintiff. After the parties' divorce, each had some property that remained to be return to each other. Plaintiff applied for and received a TRO against defendant, alleging that defendant had engaged in harassing conduct by sending over 200 emails and texts over a two-month period, addressing the return of the parties' property and defendant's continued feelings and desire to reconcile. At the FRO trial, the trial court found defendant's behavior inappropriate, but not rising to the level of domestic violence because many of defendant's messages dealt with end-of-marriage issues and property return, and were not sent with intent to harass plaintiff. However, the trial court cautioned defendant to cease communicating with plaintiff as plaintiff perceived it to be harassing, making certain reservation for arranging property return. Later on the day after the trial, defendant sent plaintiff an email requesting modification of the date for exchange and addressing other property return issues. Plaintiff sought a second TRO, alleging that defendant's email constituted harassment. However, plaintiff responded to defendant's email, and the parties exchanged several messages. At the second FRO trial, defendant argued that the requisite intent to harass was absent from defendant's email, but the trial court granted judgment for plaintiff, ruling defendant's email, in the context of the prior history rose to the level of harassment. On appeal, the court reversed, finding that the record did not support a finding that defendant intended to harass plaintiff, since communication regarding property exchange was expressly permitted by the trial court. The court further found that there was no evidence supporting plaintiff's need for a FRO, since plaintiff did not express a fear of defendant.

source http://www.njlawjournal.com/id=1202785930297/Unpublished-Opinions-for-the-Week-of-May-15-2017?mcode=0&curindex=0&curpage=2

Restraining Order FRO reversed where Judge did not find need for safety

Restraining Order FRO reversed where Judge did not find need for safety

L.R.,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

C.R.,

Defendant-Appellant.

______________________________

April 7, 2017

Submitted March 6, 2017 – Decided

Before Judges Nugent and Currier.

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Chancery Division, Family Part, Burlington County, Docket No. FV-03-1044-16.

Destribats Campbell Staub, LLC, attorneys for appellant (Raymond C. Staub, on the brief).

David T. Garnes, attorney for respondent. 

PER CURIAM SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-0 NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

Defendant (C.R.) appeals from a final restraining order (FRO) entered against him under the Prevention of Domestic Violence Act (PDVA), N.J.S.A. 2C:25-15 to -35. Because we find that the trial judge failed to consider whether a restraining order was necessary for the protection of plaintiff, L.R., as required under Silver v. Silver, 387 N.J. Super. 112, 126 (App. Div. 2006), we reverse and remand for further proceedings. 

We derive our factual summary from the trial of January 12, 2016. Plaintiff filed for and obtained a temporary restraining order (TRO) against her husband on the grounds of terroristic threats based upon events that occurred on December 30, 2015. On that date, the parties, who have been married for sixty-one years, were quarreling over defendant's phone. Plaintiff had taken it from him as she suspected him of having an affair and he was attempting to get it back from her. Plaintiff testified that defendant said if she did not let go of the phone "he was going to kill me and he was very very angry." Plaintiff threw the phone at her husband and stated she felt threatened by his words.

Both parties drove to the police station where plaintiff applied for the TRO. Plaintiff also testified that she has obtained prior TROs against defendant and that he was pulling her arm on the date of these events.

Defendant denied having an affair and denied threatening plaintiff on December 30. He testified that prior to that date, plaintiff had destroyed several phones and taken others away from him. On this morning, although plaintiff took his phone, he was able to get the phone back from her. Defendant stated that he drove to the courthouse to obtain a TRO, but it was closed. He then went to the police department where he was denied a TRO. His wife came in behind him to present her application.

Defendant denied grabbing plaintiff by the arm while quarreling with her about the phone. However, he said: "I never hit her. I push her most of the time and grab stuff away from her. I don't hit her."

In an oral decision on January 12, 2016, the trial judge found both parties to be credible but concluded that plaintiff's version of the events was more accurate. In assessing whether the predicate act of terroristic threats was satisfied, he noted that both parties had admitted to a history of pushing and shoving during the marriage. Although the judge said he was "struggling" with whether this incident was "a contretemps that's experienced by marriages or whether this rises to the level of domestic violence," he concluded that plaintiff was in fear of defendant as evidenced by her returning the phone to him. He stated: 

At that moment in time the Court does find that the plaintiff did believe that unless she returned this phone her life was being threatened.

So the Court is going to find that the terroristic threat did take place on that date and it's going to issue the final restraining order based upon that.

On appeal, defendant argues that there was insufficient proof to satisfy the finding of the predicate act of terroristic threats, and that the trial judge "did not engage in any analysis regarding [plaintiff's] need for a restraining order." 

In reviewing a decision of a family court, we "defer to the factual findings of the trial court," N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. E.P., 196 N.J. 88, 104 (2008), in recognition of the "family courts' special jurisdiction and expertise in family matters."  N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. M.C. III, 201 N.J. 328, 343 (2010) (quoting Cesare v. Cesare, 154 N.J. 394, 413 (1998)). Deference is particularly appropriate when the evidence is testimonial and involves credibility issues because the judge who observes the witnesses and hears the testimony has a perspective the reviewing court does not enjoy.  Pascale v. Pascale, 113 N.J. 20, 33 (1988) (citing Gallo v. Gallo, 66 N.J. Super. 1, 5 (App. Div. 1961)). It is only "when the trial court's conclusions are so 'clearly mistaken' or 'wide of the mark'" that we will intervene and make our own findings "to ensure that there is not a denial of justice."  E.P., supra, 196 N.J. at 104, (quoting N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. G.L., 191 N.J. 596, 605 (2007)).

Our scope of review of the trial judge's factual findings is limited. Cesare, supra, 154 N.J. at 411. We are generally bound by the trial judge's findings of fact "when supported by adequate, substantial, credible evidence."  Id. at 411-12 (citing Rova Farms Resort, Inc. v. Investors Ins. Co., 65 N.J. 474, 484 (1974)). This is especially true when questions of credibility are involved.  Id. at 412 (citing In re Return of Weapons to J.W.D., 149 N.J. 108, 117 (1997)).

In determining whether to issue an FRO under the PDVA, the court must perform a two-step analysis.  Silver, supra, 387 N.J. Super. at 125-26. "First, the judge must determine whether the plaintiff has proven, by a preponderance of the credible evidence, that one or more of the predicate acts set forth in N.J.S.A. 2C:25-19[(a)] has occurred."  Id. at 125. Second, "upon a finding of the commission of a predicate act of domestic violence," the court must determine whether it "should enter a restraining order that provides protection for the victim." Id. at 126. 

In his review of the parties' testimony, the trial judge found that at the moment of these events plaintiff was in fear for her life, which he found was evidenced by her returning the phone to defendant. He also noted the history of domestic violence in the marriage and found plaintiff's version of the events more accurate. We are satisfied that the trial judge's factual findings as to the predicate act of terroristic threats are fully supported by the record.

Once the court finds the defendant committed a predicate act under N.J.S.A. 2C:25-19(a), the court must consider whether a restraining order is "necessary."  Silver, supra, 387 N.J. Super. at 127. Although this determination may be "perfunctory and self-evident, the guiding standard is whether a restraining order is necessary . . . to protect the victim from an immediate danger or to prevent further abuse." Id. at 127. Commission of one of the enumerated acts of domestic violence does not "automatically mandate[] the [entry] of a domestic violence [restraining] order."  Kamen v. Egan, 322 N.J. Super. 222, 227 (App. Div. 1999) (citations omitted). Factors to be considered include:

(1) [t]he previous history of domestic violence between the plaintiff and defendant, including threats, harassment and physical abuse; (2) [t]he existence of immediate danger to person or property; (3) [t]he financial circumstances of the plaintiff and defendant; [and] (4) [t]he best interests of the victim and any child . . . .

[N.J.S.A. 2C:25-29(a).]

The court did not perform this analysis. Absent such an inquiry, courts are at risk of failing to strike a balance between the PDVA's purpose of protecting victims of domestic violence and being used as an "inappropriate weapon[] in domestic warfare."  J.D. v. M.D.F., 207 N.J. 458, 488 (2011). The TRO is reinstated, and the matter is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. This court does not retain jurisdiction. 

Reversed and remanded.