Domestic Violence Guidelines on Police Response Procedures

Domestic Violence 

Guidelines on Police Response Procedures 

Introduction.These general guidelines consolidate the police response procedures for domestic violence cases, including abuse and neglect of the elderly and disabled, based on State law, Court Rules, and the Domestic Violence Procedures Manual which was jointly prepared by the New Jersey Supreme Court and the Attorney General through the Division of Criminal Justice.

Original source https://www.state.nj.us/lps/dcj/agguide/dvpolrsp.htm

I. Definitions.

Domestic Violence means the occurrence of one or more of the following criminal offenses upon a person protected under the Prevention of Domestic Violence Act of 1990:

C:25-19. Definitions

As used in this act:

a. “Domestic violence” means the occurrence of one or more of the following acts inflicted upon a person protected under this act by an adult or an emancipated minor:

(1) Homicide N.J.S.2C:11-1 et seq.

(2) Assault N.J.S.2C:12-1

(3) Terroristic threats N.J.S.2C:12-3

(4) Kidnapping N.J.S.2C:13-1

(5) Criminal restraint N.J.S.2C:13-2

(6) False imprisonment N.J.S.2C:13-3

(7) Sexual assault N.J.S.2C:14-2

(8) Criminal sexual contact N.J.S.2C:14-3

(9) Lewdness N.J.S.2C:14-4

(10) Criminal mischief N.J.S.2C:17-3

(11) Burglary N.J.S.2C:18-2

(12) Criminal trespass N.J.S.2C:18-3

(13) Harassment N.J.S.2C:33-4

(14) Stalking P.L.1992, c. 209 (C.2C:12-10)

(15) Criminal coercion N.J.S.2C:13-5

(16) Robbery N.J.S.2C:15-1

(17) Contempt of a domestic violence order pursuant to subsection b. of N.J.S.2C:29-9 that constitutes a crime or disorderly persons offense

(18) Any other crime involving risk of death or serious bodily injury to a person protected under the “Prevention of Domestic Violence Act of 1991,” P.L.1991, c. 261 (C.2C:25-17 et al.)

(19) Cyber-harassment P.L.2013, c. 272 (C.2C:33–4.1)

Victim of Domestic Violence means a person protected by the domestic violence act and includes any person:


who is 18 years of age or older, or

who is an emancipated minor, and who has been subjected to domestic violence by:


spouse

former spouse

any other person who is a present or former household member, OR

who, regardless of age, has been subjected to domestic violence by a person:


with whom the victim has a child in common, or

with whom the victim anticipates having a child in common, if one of the parties is pregnant, or

who, regardless of age, has been subjected to domestic violence by a person with whom the victim has had a dating relationship.


A victim may be below the age of 18.

The domestic violence assailant must be over the age of 18 or emancipated at the time of the offense. See Paragraph C3 below for criteria for determining whether a person is emancipated.

Note:


The Prevention of Domestic Violence Act does not define a victim of domestic violence by age, physical or psychological condition or sex.

AN UNEMANCIPATED MINOR WHO COMMITS AN ACT OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE MAY NOT BE PROSECUTED AS A DOMESTIC VIOLENCE DEFENDANT BUT CAN BE PROSECUTED UNDER THE JUVENILE DELINQUENCY LAWS. THE ENTRY OF PRE- OR POST-DISPOSITIONAL RESTRAINTS CAN ALSO BE CONSIDERED.


A minor is considered emancipated from his or her parents when the minor:


has been married;

has entered military service;

has a child or is pregnant; or

has been previously declared by a court or an administrative agency to be emancipated.

II. Mandatory Arrest.A police officer must arrest and take into custody a domestic violence suspect and must sign the criminal complaint against that person if

The victim exhibits signs of injury caused by an act of domestic violence. N.J.S.A. 2C:25-21a(1).

The word, "exhibits," is to be liberally construed to mean any indication that a victim has suffered bodily injury, which shall include physical pain or any impairment of physical condition. Probable cause to arrest also may be established when the police officer observes manifestations of an internal injury suffered by the victim.

Where the victim exhibits no visible sign of injury, but states that an injury has occurred, the officer should consider other relevant factors in determining whether there is probable cause to make an arrest.


In determining which party in a domestic violence incident is the victim where both parties exhibit signs of injury, the officer should consider:


the comparative extent of injuries suffered;

the history of domestic violence between the parties, if any, or

other relevant factors.




Police shall follow standard procedures in rendering or summoning emergency treatment of the victim, if required. 

There is probable cause to believe that the terms of a no contact court order have been violated. If the victim does not have a copy of the court order, the officer may verify the existence of an order with the appropriate law enforcement agency.


A warrant is in effect.


There is probable cause to believe that a weapon as defined in N.J.S.A. 2C:39-1r has been involved in the commission of an act of domestic violence. 

III. Discretionary Arrest.A police officer may arrest a person or may sign a criminal complaint against that person, or may do both, where there is probable cause to believe that an act of domestic violence has been committed but none of the conditions in Section II. above applies.

IV. Seizure of Weapons.

Seizure of a Weapon for Safekeeping.

A police officer who has probable cause to believe that an act of domestic violence has been committed may:


Question all persons present to determine whether there are weapons, as defined in N.J.S.A. 2C:39- 1r, on the premises.

If an officer sees or learns that a weapon is present within the premises of a domestic violence incident and reasonably believes that the weapon would expose the victim to a risk of serious bodily injury, the officer should attempt to gain possession of the weapon.


If the weapon is in plain view, the officer should seize the weapon.


If the weapon is not in plain view but is located within the premises jointly possessed by both the domestic violence assailant and the domestic violence victim, the officer should obtain the consent, preferably in writing, of the domestic violence victim to search for and to seize the weapon.


If the weapon is not located within the premises jointly possessed by the domestic violence victim and assailant but is located upon other premises, the officer should attempt to obtain possession of the weapon from the possessor of the weapon, either the domestic violence assailant or a third party, by a voluntary surrender of the weapon.


If the domestic violence assailant or the possessor of the weapon refuses to surrender the weapon or to allow the officer to enter the premises to search for the named weapon, the officer should obtain a Domestic Violence Warrant for the Search and Seizure of Weapons. [See Appendix 13]


Seizure of a Weapon Pursuant to Court Order.


If a domestic violence victim obtains a court order directing that the domestic violence assailant surrender a named weapon, the officer should demand that the person surrender the named weapon.

If the domestic violence assailant or the possessor of the weapon refuses to surrender the weapon, the officer should


inform the person that the court order authorizes a search and seizure of the premises for the named weapon, and

arrest the person, if the person refuses to surrender the named weapon, for failing to comply with the court order, N.J.S.A. 2C:29- 9, and


conduct a search of the named premises for the named weapon.


The officer must append an inventory of seized weapons to the domestic violence offense report.


Weapons seized by a police officer must be promptly delivered to the county prosecutor along with a copy of the domestic violence offense report and, where applicable, the domestic violence complaint and temporary restraining order.


V. Domestic Violence Complaint.

Notice.When a police officer responds to a call of a domestic violence incident, the officer must give and explain to the victim the domestic violence notice of rights which advises the victim of available court action. N.J.S.A. 2C:25-23. The victim may file

A domestic violence complaint alleging the defendant committed an act of domestic violence and asking for court assistance to prevent its recurrence by asking for a temporary restraining court order (TRO) or other relief;

A criminal complaint alleging the defendant committed a criminal act. See Section II. Mandatory Arrest above when a police officer must sign the criminal complaint;


Both of the above.


Jurisdiction for filing domestic violence complaint by the victim.


During regular court hours,

The victim should be transported or directed to the Family Part of the Superior Court.

Where transportation of the victim to the Superior Court is not feasible, the officer should telephone the designated court by telephone for an emergent temporary restraining order in accordance with established procedure.


On weekends, holidays and other times when the court is closed.


The victim may file the domestic violence complaint before a municipal court judge specifically assigned to accept these complaints.

The victim may file a domestic violence complaint:


where the alleged act of domestic violence occurred.

where the defendant resides, or


where the victim resides or is sheltered.

Jurisdiction for filing criminal complaint by the victim in connection with filing domestic violence complaint.


A criminal complaint may be filed against the defendant in locations indicated in Paragraph B3 above.

A criminal complaint filed pursuant to Paragraph C.1 above shall be investigated and prosecuted in the jurisdiction where the offense is alleged to have occurred.


A domestic violence complaint may be filed pursuant to the provisions of Paragraph B above.


Jurisdiction for filing a criminal complaint but no accompanying domestic violence complaint.


During normal court hours, the victim may file a criminal complaint with the municipal court or police department where the alleged act occurred in accordance with departmental procedure.

On weekends, holidays and other times when the court is closed, the victim may file a criminal complaint with the law enforcement agency where the alleged act occurred.


If the police officer believes that a no-contact order should be issued, the officer should inform the court of the circumstances justifying such request when the criminal complaint is being processed and bail is about to be set. The officer should include in the domestic violence offense report the reasons for the request and the court's disposition of the request.


Victim/Witness Notification Form [See Appendix 1]


When either a criminal or domestic violence complaint is signed, a Victim/Witness Notification Form is to be completed by the person assisting the victim, either the police officer or a member of the court staff.

The victim should be informed that for the victim's protection, the prosecutor or the court must have the ability to contact the victim on short notice to inform the victim about the defendant's


impending release from custody, or

application to reduce bail.


The victim should be provided with the telephone number of the


Victim Witness Unit of the Prosecutor's Office when a criminal complaint or domestic violence contempt complaint is signed, or

Family Division Case Management Office/Domestic Violence Unit when a domestic violence complaint is signed.


The victim should be instructed to contact the appropriate office to provide new telephone numbers if the victim changes telephone numbers from the numbers listed on the Victim/Witness Notification Form.

Procedure for filing Reports.
A copy of the domestic violence offense report must be attached to all criminal complaints and to the civil domestic violence complaint when these documents are forwarded to the appropriate court.


VI. Emergent Temporary Restraining Court Orders.

Where a police officer determines that an immediate court order is necessary to protect the victim from further acts of domestic violence or the victim requests an immediate court order, the officer shall contact the designated judge by telephone, radio or other means of electronic communication. The officer should:

Assist the victim in preparing a statement to be made to the judge.

Explain that the judge will place the person under oath and will ask questions about the incident.


If the judge issues a temporary restraining order, the police officer will be instructed to enter the judge's authorization on a prescribed form.


The officer also will be instructed to print the judge's name on the temporary restraining order.


The officer will then be instructed to serve the restraining order upon the alleged offender.

VII. Service of Temporary Restraining Order (no-contact order)

When the victim obtains a no-contact court order but the defendant had not been arrested by police and is present at the scene, the officer should:

Escort the victim to his or her home.

Read the conditions of the court order to the defendant if the defendant is present.


Order the defendant to vacate the premises.


Give the defendant a reasonable period of time to gather personal belongings, unless the court order includes specific limits on time or duration.


Arrest the defendant if required by the court order or if defendant refuses to comply with the order.


Where a court order had been issued but was not served upon the defendant because the defendant could not then be located but the defendant is now at the scene, police should follow Paragraphs A.2-5 above.


When a temporary or final restraining order is issued that requires service outside the issuing county,


The restraining order, along with the complaint and any other relevant documents (e.g. search warrant, etc.) must immediately be brought or faxed to the sheriff's department in the issuing county.

The sheriff's department in the issuing county must similarly bring or fax the order and related documents to the sheriff's department in the county of the defendant's residence or business.

The sheriff's department in the receiving county, pursuant to local policy, will either


execute service on the defendant or

will immediately bring or fax the order and related documents to the police department in the municipality in which the defendant resides or works so that it can execute service accordingly.


The return of service should then be faxed back to the sheriff's department in the issuing county, which in turn must immediately deliver or fax the return of service to the Family Division in the issuing county.

When the service of a restraining order results in the seizure of weapons,


The weapons inventory should be attached to the return of service that is brought or faxed back to the issuing county.

The weapons themselves, along with any licenses, I.D. cards, or other paperwork or documentation shall be secured by the prosecutor in the seizing county for storage. At such time that the seized property is needed by the prosecutor or Family Division in the issuing county, the prosecutor in the seizing county shall forward same.

Once service on the defendant is attempted, successfully or unsuccessfully, the return of service portion of the TRO (located on the back of the last page of the multipart TRO form) must be filled out by the police or sheriff's department and immediately returned to the Family Division prior to the scheduled final hearing date.


VIII. Court Order Violations.

Where a police officer determines that a party has violated an existing restraining order either by committing a new act of domestic violence or by violating the terms of a court order, the officer must

Arrest and transport the defendant to the police station.

Sign a criminal contempt charge concerning the incident on a complaint-warrant (CDR-2).


The officer should sign a criminal complaint for all related criminal offenses. (The criminal charges should be listed on the same criminal complaint form that contain the contempt charge.)


Telephone, communicate in person or by facsimile with the appropriate judge or bail unit and request bail be set on the contempt charge.


During regular court hours, bail should be set by the emergent duty Superior Court judge that day.

On weekends, holidays and other times when the court is closed, bail should be set by the designated emergent duty Superior Court judge except in those counties where a municipal court judge has been authorized to set bail for non-indictable contempt charges by the assignment judge.


When bail is set by a judge when the courts are closed, the officer shall arrange to have the clerk of the Family Part notified on the next working day of the new complaint, the amount of bail, the defendant's whereabouts and all other necessary details.


If a municipal court judge set the bail, the arresting officer shall notify the clerk of that municipal court of this information.

If the defendant is unable to post bail, take appropriate steps to have the defendant incarcerated at police headquarters or the county jail.

Where the officer deems there is no probable cause to arrest or sign a criminal complaint against the defendant for a violation of no contact court order, the officer must advise the victim of the procedure for completing and signing a


criminal complaint alleging a violation of the court order.

During regular court hours, the officer should advise the victim that the complaint must be filed with the Family Part of the Chancery Division of Superior Court.

On weekends, holidays and other hours when the court is closed.


the officer should transport or arrange for transportation to have the victim taken to headquarters to sign the complaint;

the alleged offender shall be charged with contempt of a domestic violence court order, N.J.S.A. 2C:29-9. The victim must sign the complaint. A complaint-warrant (CDR-2) must be prepared;


the officer in charge shall follow standard police procedure in arranging to have a court set bail.

civil complaint against the defendant for violations of a court order pertaining to support or monetary compensation, custody, visitation or counseling. The victim should be referred to the Family Division Case Management Office to pursue this civil enforcement of the court order.

IX. Criminal Offenses Against the Elderly and Disabled.

Where an elderly or disabled person is subjected to a criminal offense listed as an act of domestic violence, police shall follow the appropriate procedure listed above.

Where the actions or omissions against an elderly or disabled person do not meet the domestic violence conditions, police may file appropriate criminal charges against the offender.


A person may be charged with Endangering the Welfare of the Elderly or Disabled, N.J.S.A. 2C:24-8, if the person has:


a legal duty to care for or has assumed continuing responsibility for the care of a person who is:

60 years of age or older, or

emotionally, psychologically or physically disabled, and

the person unreasonably neglects or fails to permit to be done


any act necessary for the physical or mental health of the elderly or disabled person.

Original source https://www.state.nj.us/lps/dcj/agguide/dvpolrsp.htm

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TRO dismissed where no intent to annoy A.B. v. W.C.,

TRO dismissed where no intent to annoy A.B.  v. W.C., Defendant-Respondent.

DOCKET NO. A-0165-18T3 

12-20-2019 PER CURIAM

RECORD IMPOUNDED

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3. Before Judges Koblitz, Whipple, and Mawla. On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Chancery Division, Family Part, Hudson County, Docket No. FV-09-1876-18. PER CURIAM 

Plaintiff A.B. appeals from a July 30, 2018 dismissal of a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) obtained against defendant W.C. pursuant to the Prevention of Domestic Violence Act (PDVA), N.J.S.A. 2C:25-17 to -35. We affirm. 

In June 2016, the parties met at a sports bar where plaintiff was employed. They began a dating relationship in the spring of 2017 and lasted until January 2018. During their relationship, the parties and plaintiff's children traveled domestically and internationally, which defendant funded in large part. Defendant also gave plaintiff gifts and funds to meet various expenses during their relationship. 

The parties' final vacation together occurred the weekend of January 12, 2018. Approximately one week later, the parties went on a date to the movies. Plaintiff was not feeling well, so afterwards on January 22, defendant texted to ask how she felt. Plaintiff replied, "do not tex[t] me more or call me [please], or if [you do, I will] block you, this is over . . . thanks for everything." Defendant texted the following reply: "You do not have to block me. But it is so easy for you to say it is over. I guess I was never important to you even after everything I did." 

On January 25, defendant gave a note containing money to a co-worker and instructed him to place it on plaintiff's vehicle. The note stated: 

Hi [A.B.], here's the money for the movie and babysitter. I hope you're feeling better. I would like for us to talk about it because we are not kids to do this with a text and after everything I did for you, I deserve it. I am a person with feelings. I will not text you because I imagine you blocked me.

Having received no reply, defendant sent plaintiff text messages on January 29, February 2, 3, and 5, expressing that he missed and loved her and asking if he could take her to a concert and take her children to a live show. 

Plaintiff filed a domestic violence complaint and obtained a TRO on March 9, 2018. She subsequently amended the complaint in April and May alleging harassment, stalking, and contempt of a domestic violence order as well as a full description of her domestic violence allegations. 

In its final iteration, plaintiff alleged a prior history of domestic violence, including a claim defendant went to her job on February 17, 2018, to talk to her, but when she refused, he left angry. Plaintiff claimed when she left work that evening, she drove home and discovered defendant had flattened one of her tires with five nails. At the trial, plaintiff testified it snowed that day and she drove for an hour to get home; when she arrived home, she noticed the flat because she heard air escaping from the tire. Plaintiff testified she sent defendant a  message the following day accusing him of damaging her tire and claiming she had a video of him doing so. On cross-examination, plaintiff admitted she fabricated the claim regarding the video. 

As predicate acts of domestic violence, plaintiff alleged the note left on her vehicle on January 25, "caused her [to] fear for her safety and the safety of her children." Her complaint also alleged defendant appeared at her job on March 9, near the end of her work shift, and "cut off her vehicle and attempted to start a conversation in the middle of the highway, then showed up at her house and attempted to follow her into her parking garage . . . ." She also alleged on March 9: 

Def[endant] was waiting for pla[intiff] outside of her job. Def[endant] stood in front of pla[intiff's] car and told pla[intiff] to get out and talk to him. Pla[intiff] refused, sped up[,] and continued to head towards pla[intiff's] house. When pla[intiff] got home, def[endant] was there in his car and he was blocking pla[intiff's] way into the parking lot. Def[endant] kept saying that pla[intiff] should return the gifts that he gave the pla[intiff] and if she didn't, def[endant] would kill her.

Plaintiff's complaint alleged she discovered her tire was flattened again after work on March 16. She also alleged on April 22, she was walking home with her children and saw defendant parked two buildings away from her home watching them walk home. On April 24, plaintiff alleged she saw defendant's  vehicle parked in front of her home as she was leaving, the parties saw one another, plaintiff got into her car to drive to defendant's car to video him, and he left. 

During her testimony, plaintiff gave varying accounts of the March 9 incident. She testified defendant intercepted her vehicle in different locations, namely, her employer's parking lot, a nearby road, or on a highway, but could not explain precisely where. She offered no testimony to support her allegation that defendant followed her home. Defendant testified he frequented plaintiff's place of employment because it was a sports bar. He conceded he hoped to see plaintiff there. However, he denied following plaintiff home, and instead drove there after she drove away in hopes of speaking with her regarding the demise of their relationship. 

When the parties arrived at plaintiff's home, she claimed defendant blocked her vehicle again and threatened to kill her if she did not return the gifts and money he gave her. Plaintiff claimed she contacted the police who arrived within three minutes. However, the detective who responded to plaintiff's call testified she did not relay the death threat to him. 

Plaintiff testified defendant was responsible for damaging her tires a second time on April 4. However, she conceded she did not report this alleged  violation of the TRO to police. Moreover, at trial defendant provided video surveillance of her employer's parking lot, revealing no one tampered with plaintiff's vehicle. 

Plaintiff testified consistently with the narrative in her complaint regarding the April 22 and 24 incidents, alleging harassment and stalking. However, defendant produced time-stamped pictures of the GPS location of his cellular telephone and a store receipt, evidencing he was nowhere in the vicinity of plaintiff on the dates and times in question. 

In his oral opinion dismissing plaintiff's complaint, the trial judge concluded plaintiff's testimony was to "large degrees[,] not believable." The judge stated plaintiff gave "different versions of what happened during [the March 9] encounter, where it happened and under what circumstances." The judge found defendant's attempts to contact plaintiff did not constitute harassment because his "efforts to communicate with [her] were an attempt . . . to either reestablish the relationship or at least obtain an explanation as to why she had ended it after several years . . . ." Similarly, the judge found "the contents of the note, which had to do with money for a babysitter and taking children to a movie, . . . even if unwanted, does not fit any definition of harassment." The judge concluded plaintiff's allegation that defendant  threatened to kill her was "not believable" because she did not report it to the police. 

Referring to the alleged history of domestic violence and the March 16 predicate act alleged in the complaint, the judge found plaintiff's testimony did 

not establish that [defendant] had anything to do with the tires becoming flat or that he put nails in the tire and her testimony that on one event where she drove from [work] to [home] in the snow for an hour with . . . nails that she believed [defendant] had put in her tire, without knowing until she got to her home that the tire was flat and her testimony that it was still leaking air at that time and she could hear it, is also not believable.

Regarding the April 22 and 24 predicate acts alleged in the complaint, the judge concluded defendant's "testimony that he was elsewhere and the receipts he provided to prove that he was somewhere else on both of those occasions is more convincing than [plaintiff's] testimony that he was at or near her home." 

I.

The scope of appellate review of a trial court's fact-finding function is limited. The general rule is that findings by the trial court are binding on appeal when supported by adequate, substantial, credible evidence. Rova Farms Resort, Inc. v. Inv'rs Ins. Co., 65 N.J. 474, 484 (1974). Deference is especially appropriate "when the evidence is largely testimonial and involves questions of credibility." In re Return of Weapons to J.W.D., 149 N.J. 108, 117 (1997). Because a trial court "'hears the case, sees and observes the witnesses, [and] hears them testify,' it has a better perspective than a

reviewing court in evaluating the veracity of witnesses." Pascale v. Pascale, 113 N.J. 20, 33 (1988) (quoting Gallo v. Gallo, 66 N.J. Super. 1, 5 (App. Div. 1961)) (alterations in original). Therefore, an appellate court should not disturb the "factual findings and legal conclusions of the trial judge unless [it is] convinced that they are so manifestly unsupported by or inconsistent with the competent, relevant and reasonably credible evidence as to offend the interests of justice." Rova Farms, 65 N.J. at 484. The appellate court should "exercise its original fact finding jurisdiction sparingly and in none but a clear case where there is no doubt about the matter." Ibid. 

Furthermore, matrimonial courts possess special expertise in the field of domestic relations. See Brennan [ v. Orban], 145 N.J. [282,] 300-01 (1996). . . .

Because of the family courts' special jurisdiction and expertise in family matters, appellate courts should accord deference to family court factfinding. As noted previously by this Court, the Legislature "has reposed grave responsibilities on Family Part judges to ensure the safety and well-being of women and children in our society . . . . We are confident that they can successfully balance the interests of society in deterring the evils of domestic violence and caring for families." Brennan, 145 N.J. at 304-05.

[Cesare v. Cesare, 154 N.J. 394, 411-13 (1998)].

On appeal, plaintiff argues the trial judge failed to make any findings regarding the predicate act of stalking. She argues the judge's findings regarding credibility and harassment, were against the weight of the evidence. 

II.

Plaintiff asserts she proved harassment pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:33-4(a) and (c) and the judge's findings to the contrary were error. We disagree. 

Our Supreme Court has stated: 

The harassment statute provides in relevant part:

[A] person commits a petty disorderly persons offense if, with purpose to harass another, he:

a. Makes, or causes to be made, a communication or communications anonymously or at extremely inconvenient hours, or in offensively coarse language, or any other manner likely to cause annoyance or alarm;

. . . .

or

c. Engages in any other course of alarming conduct or of repeatedly committed acts with purpose to alarm or seriously annoy such other person.

A communication under subsection a. may be deemed to have been made either at the place where it originated or at the place where it was received.

[N.J.S.A. 2C:33-4.]

. . . .

A violation of subsection (a) requires the following elements: (1) defendant made or caused to be made a communication; (2) defendant's purpose in making or causing the communication to be made was to harass another person; and (3) the communication was in one of the specified manners or any other manner similarly likely to cause annoyance or alarm to its intended recipient.

The purpose to be served by enactment of the harassment statute is to make criminal, private annoyances that are not entitled to constitutional protection. . . . Thus, the substantive criminal offense proscribed by subsection (a) "is directed at the purpose behind and motivation for" making or causing the communication to be made.

. . . .

The New Jersey Code of Criminal Justice defines "purposely" as follows: "A person acts purposely with respect to the nature of his conduct or a result thereof if it is his conscious object to engage in conduct of that nature or to cause such a result." N.J.S.A. 2C:2-2(b)(1).

. . . .

A finding of a purpose to harass may be inferred from the evidence presented. State v. McDougald, 120 N.J. 523, 566-67 (1990); State v. Avena, 281 N.J. Super. 327, 340 (App. Div. 1995). Common sense and experience may inform that determination. State v. Richards, 155 N.J. Super. 106, 118 (App. Div. 1978).

. . . .

[S]ubsection (a) proscribes a single act of communicative conduct when its purpose is to harass. Under that subsection, annoyance means to disturb, irritate, or bother. . . . In contrast to subsection (a), which targets a single communication, subsection (c) targets a course of conduct. Subsection (c) proscribes a course of alarming conduct or repeated acts with a purpose to alarm or seriously annoy an intended victim.

[State v. Hoffman, 149 N.J. 564, 576-78, 80 (1997) (internal citation omitted) (emphasis omitted).]

Plaintiff did not meet her burden of proof to establish harassment because she failed to prove defendant's intent was to disturb, bother, seriously annoy, or alarm her as defined by N.J.S.A. 2C:33-4(a) or (c), respectively. The contents of defendant's texts and the note he had delivered to plaintiff contained no threats or words to infer an intent to annoy or alarm as contemplated by the PDVA. 

Had defendant intercepted plaintiff's vehicle in the middle of a road or a highway on March 9, as plaintiff claimed, such conduct would be alarming or seriously annoying as defined by N.J.S.A. 2C:334-4(a) and (c). Indeed, even if defendant's intent was to speak with plaintiff regarding the reasons for the demise of their relationship, the court could infer the means he used to seek out plaintiff constituted harassment. However, the inconsistency of plaintiff's testimony, which did not prove the interaction occurred on a roadway, but based  on defendant's testimony, more logically took place in the parking lot of a sports bar defendant frequented, does not persuade us the judge erred. 

We also reach the same conclusion regarding plaintiff's assertion defendant followed her home. Plaintiff offered no support for this claim. Given the parties' longstanding relationship, defendant was familiar with how to get to plaintiff's home from her job. For these reasons, the record supports the judge's finding that defendant did not follow plaintiff home, and instead traveled there on a separate route after she drove by him in the parking lot. 

Furthermore, the judge did not err when he concluded plaintiff did not prove defendant threatened to kill her. Plaintiff alleged she informed the officer who responded to her residence on March 9, 2018, about the threat. The officer testified she did not inform him of the alleged threat. On cross-examination, plaintiff asserted the officer lied about the fact that she did not tell him. The totality of the evidence in the record, namely, plaintiff's lack of credibility in describing defendant's conduct, defendant's explanation of the reasons for traveling to her home, and the lack of any indication the officer testified incredibly confirms this allegation was unproven. The sum of the evidence supports the trial judge's conclusion defendant did not threaten plaintiff. 

Plaintiff's allegation defendant harassed her by flattening her tires also suffered due to her lack of credibility. As part of the history of domestic violence, plaintiff alleged defendant previously damaged her tires and there was a video of the incident, yet she conceded there was no such evidence. Given this background, the judge did not err when plaintiff alleged similar conduct as a predicate act, and defendant produced objective video evidence showing he was not near her vehicle on the day of the incident. 

Similarly, on appeal, plaintiff asserts the judge improperly took judicial notice when he concluded it was impossible for her to drive an hour in the snow with nails in her tires and arrive home with them still deflating. Again, the judge concluded that plaintiff's testimony was not credible. He did not take judicial notice of facts, which contemplates recognition of universally known facts, facts of common notoriety, or generalized knowledge. N.J.R.E. 201(b). 

Plaintiff also did not meet her burden of proof regarding the alleged acts of harassment in April 2018. Defendant adduced objective alibi evidence demonstrating he was elsewhere when she allegedly saw him outside her residence on two occasions. This evidence and her lack of credibility rebutted plaintiff's unsupported allegations. 

III.

N.J.S.A. 2C:12-10(a) defines stalking as: 

(1) "Course of conduct" means repeatedly maintaining a visual or physical proximity to a person; directly, indirectly, or through third parties, by any action, method, device, or means, following, monitoring, observing, surveilling, threatening, or communicating to or about, a person, or interfering with a person's property; repeatedly committing harassment against a person; or repeatedly conveying, or causing to be conveyed, verbal or written threats or threats conveyed by any other means of communication or threats implied by conduct or a combination thereof directed at or toward a person.

(2) "Repeatedly" means on two or more occasions.

(3) "Emotional distress" means significant mental suffering or distress.

(4) "Cause a reasonable person to fear" means to cause fear which a reasonable victim, similarly situated, would have under the circumstances.

Furthermore, 

[a] person is guilty of stalking, a crime of the fourth degree, if he purposefully or knowingly engages in a course of conduct directed at a specific person that would cause a reasonable person to fear for his safety or the safety of a third person or suffer other emotional distress.

[N.J.S.A. 2C:12-10(b).]

Plaintiff argues the trial judge made no findings regarding the predicate act of stalking. She asserts the entirety of the allegations set forth in her complaint represent a "pattern of conduct" and prove stalking. 

The judge's decision lacks an explicit finding on stalking. However, his findings that plaintiff failed to prove any of the predicate acts of domestic violence also demonstrated plaintiff did not prove defendant repeatedly surveilled, followed, monitored, threatened, or harassed her, or interfered with her property, to meet the definitional elements of N.J.S.A. 2C:12-10(a)(1)-(4).