Monday, August 17, 2020

J.R.M., v. S.A.M., Rude email not grounds for TRO

 J.R.M.,             v.  S.A.M.,        

 

 SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY                                                          APPELLATE DIVISION                                                          DOCKET NO. A-5938-17T1 _________________________     Argued June 25, 2019 – Decided October 15, 2019


                    Before Judges Rothstadt and Suter.


                    On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey,

                    Chancery Division, Family Part, Union County, Docket

                    No. FV-20-1718-18.

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

                               APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

        This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the

     internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.



                              PER CURIAM

      Defendant S.A.M. appeals from the Family Part's August 24, 2018 order


granting her former husband, plaintiff, J.R.M. a Final Restraining Order (FRO)


and awarding attorney's fees against her under the Prevention of Domestic


Violence Act of 1991 (PDVA),  N.J.S.A. 2C:25-17 to -35. The trial judge


entered the order after finding that defendant had committed the predicate act of


harassment,  N.J.S.A. 2C:33-4(c), by following plaintiff and taking pictures of


him, his wife, and her children while at the boardwalk in Point Pleasant.


      On appeal, defendant argues that the judge's order should be reversed


because his finding of a predicate act under the PDVA was unsupported by the


evidence as a "matter of law," and because "plaintiff failed to prove that relief


under the PDVA [was] necessary to prevent further abuse." In addition, she


contends that the judge erred by awarding attorney's fees and requiring that they


be paid within sixty days. We agree with defendant's contentions about the lack


of evidence to support the trial judge's conclusions and we reverse his


determination.


      The parties were married in 1996 and had two children, who at the time


of the alleged domestic violence incident were both emancipated and estranged


from plaintiff. The parties were divorced in 2016 and at the time of the alleged





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domestic violence incident, plaintiff, who had remarried, lived in Cranford with


his wife and her children. Defendant resided in Pennsylvania.


      Three days before the day of the incident, the parties' son had graduated


from high school and became emancipated. According to plaintiff, defendant


had alienated their son from him, as determined by a court in Pennsylvania, and


she became upset about the anticipated loss of child support.1 At that time,


defendant began texting and emailing plaintiff, even though he had mailed her


a May 2017 letter telling her to "cease and desist" from contacting him.


      The alleged harassment took place on June 18, 2018, beginning at 2:00


p.m. in Point Pleasant. Plaintiff and his new family arrived to spend the day on


the boardwalk and beach before taking his twelve-year-old stepdaughter to a


Girl Scouts event. Soon after his arrival, plaintiff realized defendant was in


Point Pleasant after he saw defendant's car parked on the street. Upon seeing


her vehicle, plaintiff took photographs of her parked car and proceeded to the


boardwalk.





1

   Earlier, a Pennsylvania court entered an order acknowledging the son's

anticipated emancipation and directed that a hearing be scheduled to address

plaintiff's contention that defendant did not comply with earlier parenting time

orders even though those orders expired with the son's emancipation.

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      At approximately 4:00 p.m., plaintiff observed defendant and their adult


daughter on the boardwalk. Plaintiff believed he saw them taking photographs


of him and his new family, although no photographs from the incident were ever


produced. There was also no verbal or physical confrontation between plaintiff,


defendant, or their daughter. Although she knew defendant was in the area,


plaintiff's wife became panicked and petrified upon seeing defendant, whom the


wife believed to be unstable. Nevertheless, plaintiff and his wife felt safe


knowing the Girl Scouts were nearby and allowed the stepdaughter to play on


the rides until it was time to leave.


      Plaintiff's wife believed defendant knew in advance about their plan to go


to Point Pleasant. According to plaintiff's wife, she had informed her former


spouse they were going to Point Pleasant and he then told defendant about their


plans. According to plaintiff's wife, her former spouse and defendant were


friendly. Her former spouse, however, denied advising defendant that his former


wife, plaintiff, and the children would be in Point Pleasant on that day.


      Although plaintiff claimed he filed a police report with the Point Pleasant


Police Department after the incident, he did not possess a copy of the report and


he did not seek a restraining order that day. During the days following the


incident, the parties exchanged texts and emails about defendant's behavior.



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      The day after the incident, defendant and her son got into an argument that


resulted in his leaving the house and going to plaintiff's home, after the son


called plaintiff to pick him up that day. When plaintiff arrived to pick up his


son, he did so with a police escort.


      On June 21, 2018, plaintiff obtained a temporary restraining order from


the Family Part based upon the allegations of a complaint he filed that day. In


his complaint, plaintiff stated that defendant committed the predicate act of


harassment by "dodging behind cars, hiding behind the games [on the


boardwalk], and appeared to be taking photos of the plaintiff and his family."


      The complaint also addressed what was alleged to be a past history of


domestic violence. It stated that from 2014 to 2018, defendant had "subjected


[him] to thousands of harassing and threatening emails . . .[,] plaintiff was


forced to file a 'cease and desist' order[2] against the defendant [that defendant]


ignored . . . and continued to email" plaintiff. The complaint also set forth


specific incidents in 2012 when defendant allegedly strangled him and threw


items around their house. It further alluded to "past disputes" during which


defendant grabbed plaintiff "around the neck and/or slapped [him] on the back




2

  No such order existed. The allegation actually referred to the May 2017 letter

plaintiff sent to defendant.

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of the head."    The complaint also stated that defendant threatened "to kill


herself;" "conveyed threats to harm and/or kill" him; and "damaged household


items."


      The matter came before the trial judge for a trial on the FRO on July 12,


2018. At trial, plaintiff was represented by counsel. Defendant was self-


represented. Plaintiff, his wife, and her former spouse testified for plaintiff.


Defendant, her adult daughter, and defendant's mother testified on her behalf.


Defendant's mother's testimony related specifically to her grandson's


involvement with counseling and the parties' dispute regarding his therapy.


      Plaintiff testified to his version of what occurred and to the emails and


texts he received from defendant. According to plaintiff, those communications


related to defendant's demands for payment of child support, threats that plaintiff


would not see his children, and wishes that he was dead. He also described


phone calls he alleged defendant made to him at all hours about her wanting him


to pay for things for their children. The trial judge admitted ten emails and texts


as examples of the alleged thousands of emails sent by defendant. Those emails


primarily related to the parties' parenting issues as to their son.


      After considering the testimony and the documents admitted into


evidence, the judge placed his findings on the record. The judge concluded that



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plaintiff had met his burden of proof. The judge identified harassment as the


predicate offense pled by plaintiff and noted his testimony about "a prior history


of domestic violence, or harassing behavior."


      The judge also described the dispute concerning the parties' son, as


testified to by defendant and her mother, as an intervening action. The issue


involved the son's reunification with plaintiff, whether defendant was


obstructing that process, and the son's emancipation upon graduation from high


school that resulted in the termination of child support which, according to the


judge, "caused some upset between the plaintiff and the defendant" on June 18.


However, the judge later corrected himself, stating that the date of the argument


was actually June 15, pre-dating the June 18 incident.


      The judge then stated that he reviewed all the emails exchanged between


the parties and he found their behavior was getting worse over time.            He


described the contents as "name calling" and "accusations." He turned to an


email from January 10, 2018, two years after the divorce, in which defendant


stated to plaintiff they were never going to reach a point of being "civil" with


each other. He also found that while there "was some testimony about physical


violence, there wasn't much, if any, testimony about physical violence, . . . and


there's no documentary or other proof of that."



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      He established plaintiff's continuing fear of defendant by relying upon


plaintiff choosing to have the police accompany him the day after the incident


when he picked up his son. According to the judge, that indicated plaintiff had


a level of fear or concern about the reprisal. The judge credited plaintiff's


testimony by stating that "he believes he needs an FRO because he fears for the


safety of himself, his wife . . . and his three stepchildren . . . as a result of the


defendant's actions." He found that the plaintiff's wife was very concerned about


her children and found that she became panicked and immediately wanted to


leave upon seeing defendant at the boardwalk.


      After reviewing each of the witnesses' testimony, the judge placed his


conclusions on the record. He stated the following:


             If I were to look at the incident of June 18 in a vacuum,

             I would question whether it is sufficient to constitute a

             predicate act of domestic violence. But I'm not allowed

             to do that because the statute tells me I've gotta look at

             the allegation in conjunction with the history of

             domestic violence. And I don't think that there is

             much . . . doubt in my mind that, taken in conjunction,

             there is sufficient proof, under 2C:33-4(c), of . . . an

             act of harassment having occurred because I do believe

             that the defendant, with the purpose to harass the

             plaintiff, engaged in a course of alarming conduct of

             repeatedly committed acts with the purpose to alarm or

             seriously annoy.





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      The judge concluded that there was a "purpose on the part of the defendant


to harass the plaintiff in this case."


      The judge then addressed the factors under Silver v. Silver,  387 N.J.


Super. 112 (App. Div. 2006), and found that the emails and text messages gave


rise to a need for a FRO because plaintiff did not want to receive those emails


and text messages.


      The judge entered the FRO on July 12, 2018. Later, after submissions


were made by counsel, the judge entered an amended FRO on August 24, 2018,


which included an award of counsel fees in the amount of $4469 in favor of


plaintiff and against defendant as an element of damages under the PDVA. This


appeal followed.


      Our review of a Family Part judge's granting of an FRO is limited. We accord


"great deference to discretionary decisions of Family Part judges" given the "family


courts' special jurisdiction and expertise in family matters." G.M. v. C.V.,  453 N.J.


Super. 1, 11 (App. Div. 2018) (first quoting Milne v. Goldenberg,  428 N.J. Super.

 184, 197 (App. Div. 2012); and then quoting N.J. Div. of Youth and Family Servs.


v. M.C. III,  201 N.J. 328, 343 (2010)). When reviewing "a trial court's order


entered following trial in a domestic violence matter, we grant substantial


deference to the trial court's findings of fact and the legal conclusions based



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upon those findings." D.N. v. K.M.,  429 N.J. Super. 592, 596 (App. Div. 2013).


We do "not disturb the 'factual findings and legal conclusions of the trial judge


unless [we are] convinced that they are so manifestly unsupported by or


inconsistent with the competent, relevant and reasonably credible evidence as to


offend the interests of justice.'" Cesare v. Cesare,  154 N.J. 394, 412 (1998)


(quoting Rova Farms Resort, Inc. v. Inv'rs Ins.,  65 N.J. 474, 484 (1974)).


Deference is particularly appropriate when the evidence is testimonial and


involves credibility issues because the judge who observes the witnesses and


hears the testimony has a perspective that the reviewing court does not enjoy.


Pascale v. Pascale,  113 N.J. 20, 33 (1988). However, we owe no deference to a


Family Part judge's legal conclusions. See S.D. v. M.J.R.,  415 N.J. Super. 417,


430 (App. Div. 2010) (citing Manalapan Realty, L.P. v. Twp. Comm. of Twp.


of Manalapan,  140 N.J. 366, 378 (1995)) ("We, of course, review the judge's


legal conclusions de novo.").


      In determining whether to issue an FRO, the court first must determine


whether the plaintiff has established, by a preponderance of the evidence, that


the defendant has committed a predicate act of domestic violence as defined in


 N.J.S.A. 2C:25-19(a). Silver,  387 N.J. Super. at 125. The PDVA defines


domestic violence by referring to a list of predicate offenses found within the



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New Jersey Criminal Code. J.D. v. M.D.F.,  207 N.J. 458, 473 (2011). "[T]he


commission of a predicate act, if the plaintiff meets the definition of a 'victim


of domestic violence,' constitutes domestic violence . . . ."       Ibid. (quoting


 N.J.S.A. 2C:25-19(d)).


        If the court determines a plaintiff established, by a preponderance of the


evidence, that the defendant has committed a predicate act of domestic violence


as defined in  N.J.S.A. 2C:25-19(a), it must then consider the factors enumerated


in  N.J.S.A. 2C:25-29(a)(1) to (6),3 to determine whether an FRO is necessary



3

    The factors are:


              (1) The previous history of domestic violence between

              the plaintiff and defendant, including threats,

              harassment and physical abuse;


              (2) The existence of immediate danger to person or

              property;


              (3) The financial circumstances of the plaintiff and

              defendant;


              (4) The best interests of the victim and any child;


              (5) In determining custody and parenting time the

              protection of the victim's safety; and


              (6) The existence of a verifiable order of protection

              from another jurisdiction.


              [ N.J.S.A. 2C:25-29(a)(1) to (6).]

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"to protect the victim from an immediate danger or to prevent further abuse."


Silver,  387 N.J. Super. at 125-27; see also A.M.C. v. P.B.,  447 N.J. Super. 402,


414 (App. Div. 2016). "Commission of a predicate act is necessary, but alone


insufficient, to trigger relief provided by the [PDVA]." R.G. v. R.G.,  449 N.J.


Super. 208, 228 (App. Div. 2017). The mere finding of a predicate act of


domestic violence, standing alone, is insufficient to support the issuance of an


FRO. Kamen v. Egan,  322 N.J. Super. 222, 227 (App. Div. 1999).


      Whether a plaintiff has established an act of domestic violence has


occurred is not determined in a vacuum. As we have stated:


            The law mandates that acts claimed by a plaintiff to be

            domestic violence must be evaluated in light of the

            previous history of domestic violence between the

            plaintiff and defendant including previous threats,

            harassment and physical abuse and in light of whether

            immediate danger to the person or property is present.

             N.J.S.A. 2C:25-29(a)(1) and (2). This requirement

            reflects the reality that domestic violence is ordinarily

            more than an isolated aberrant act and incorporates the

            legislative intent to provide a vehicle to protect victims

            whose safety is threatened. This is the backdrop on

            which defendant's acts must be evaluated.


            [R.G.,  449 N.J. Super. at 228-29 (quoting Corrente v.

            Corrente,  281 N.J. Super. 243, 248 (App. Div. 1995)).]


      Applying these guiding principles, we first examine whether the record


demonstrates, by a preponderance of the evidence, that defendant committed a



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predicate act of domestic violence. Here, the judge considered whether plaintiff


proved harassment,  N.J.S.A. 2C:33-4(c), a predicate act under the PDVA.


 N.J.S.A. 2C:25-19(a). Harassment occurs when a person, with the purpose to


harass another, "[e]ngages in any other course of alarming conduct or of


repeatedly committed acts with purpose to alarm or seriously annoy such other


person."  N.J.S.A. 2C:33-4(c). A finding of harassment requires proof the


defendant acted with a purpose to harass. See Silver,  387 N.J. Super. at 124.


Although a purpose to harass may, in some cases, be "inferred from the


evidence" and from "[c]ommon sense and experience," a finding by the court


that the defendant acted with the purpose or intent to harass another is integral


to a determination of harassment. State v. Hoffman,  149 N.J. 564, 576-77


(1997). There must be proof that a defendant's conscious object was to "harass,"


that is, "annoy," "torment," "wear out," and "exhaust." State v. Castagna,  387 N.J. Super. 598, 607 (App. Div. 2006) (quoting Webster's II New College


Dictionary 504 (1995)).


      Merely knowing that someone would be annoyed, as opposed to having a


conscious objective to annoy, is insufficient to prove a purpose to harass. See


State v. Fuchs,  230 N.J. Super. 420, 428 (App. Div. 1989). Moreover, a "victim's





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subjective reaction alone will not suffice; there must be evidence of the improper


purpose." J.D.,  207 N.J. at 487.


       N.J.S.A. 2C:33-4(c) "was never intended to protect against the common


stresses, shocks, and insults of life that come from exposure to crude remarks


and offensive expressions, teasing and rumor mongering, and general


inappropriate behavior. The aim of subsection (c) is not to enforce a code of


civil behavior or proper manners." State v. Burkert,  231 N.J. 257, 285 (2017).


      In Burkert, the Court held, as it did twenty years ago in Hoffman,  149 N.J.


at 580-81, "[t]hat the primary thrust of  N.J.S.A. 2C:33-4(c) is not to interdict


speech, but rather conduct . . . ." Id. at 273. Therefore, the Court "construe[d]


the terms 'any other course of alarming conduct' and 'acts with purpose to alarm


or seriously annoy' as repeated communications directed at a person that


reasonably put that person in fear for his safety or security or that intolerably


interfere[d] with that person's reasonable expectation of privacy." Id. at 284-85


(emphasis added).


      Applying these principles, we cannot conclude from the judge's findings


that defendant engaged in a "course of alarming conduct" or acts that rose to the


level of what the Legislature intended as "domestic violence" under the PDVA.


In this case, defendant allegedly took photographs of plaintiff and his family in



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public. Defendant's acts, even considered against the backdrop of the alleged


transmittal of texts and emails containing nasty marital contretemps over the


years, while obviously inappropriate, simply did not constitute a "course of


alarming conduct" or the invasion of privacy necessary to sustain the entry of


the FRO. See State v. Sloane,  193 N.J. 423, 435 (2008) (quoting Doe v. Poritz,


 142 N.J. 1, 28 n.8 (1995) (stating a person "has no reasonable expectation of


privacy in his . . . photograph")).


      The statute prohibiting harassment is intended to criminalize "repeated


threats or menacing communications that reasonably place a person in fear for


his safety or security" or actions such as "repeated[] . . . unwanted


communications . . . thereby intolerably interfering with [a victim's] reasonable


expectation of privacy." Id. at 285. Here, defendant never threatened plaintiff's


safety, security, or privacy by taking photographs in public and her emails and


texts, like plaintiff's, were unkind but not threatening or alarming as


contemplated by the statute. Under these circumstances, we conclude that


defendant's acts as found by the trial judge were insufficient to establish the


alleged predicate act.


      Even if this were not the case, the FRO would still have to be reversed


because the judge did not find a FRO was necessary to protect plaintiff "from



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an immediate danger or to prevent further abuse." Silver,  387 N.J. Super. at

 127. He found only that plaintiff's wife was disturbed by defendant's conduct


and that it was necessary to stop defendant from sending emails and texts. Such


conduct hardly amounts to the type of fear contemplated by both the statute and


Silver. See ibid.; see also  N.J.S.A. 2C:25-29(a)(2) (identifying "[t]he existence


of immediate danger to person or property" as a factor).


      Reversed. The matter is remanded to the trial court to vacate the FRO and


the award of counsel fees. We do not retain jurisdiction.

Wednesday, June 24, 2020

No egregious action to warrant restraining order A.B., v. D.M.O.,


No egregious action to warrant restraining order A.B.,   v.

D.M.O.,

     Defendant-Appellant.
_______________________

                Submitted May 20, 2020 – Decided June 8, 2020

                Before Judges Koblitz and Mawla.

                On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey,
                Chancery Division, Family Part, Passaic County,
                Docket No. FV-16-1688-19.

 
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
                             APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
     This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the
  internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases i s limited. R. 1:36-3.




                                                     SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
                                                     APPELLATE DIVISION
                                                     DOCKET NO. A-4648-18T3
PER CURIAM
      Defendant D.M.O. 1 appeals from the May 29, 2019 Family Part order,

granting plaintiff A.B. a final restraining order (FRO), pursuant to the

Prevention of Domestic Violence Act (PDVA),  N.J.S.A. 2C:25-17 to -35.

Defendant argues that plaintiff presented insufficient evidence of the predicate

acts of harassment,  N.J.S.A. 2C:33-4, and cyber harassment,  N.J.S.A. 2C:33-

4.1, and that plaintiff was in need of a FRO. Because the court's analysis of

the second prong of the test announced in Silver v. Silver,  387 N.J. Super. 112

(App. Div. 2006), was incomplete and failed to consider the relevant  N.J.S.A.

2C:25-29(a) factors, we reverse.

      Plaintiff, now seventy-two years old, and defendant, now forty-one years

old, were involved romantically for about four years, including the two years

they lived together in plaintiff's home.     Plaintiff owns an estate, which

includes a farm and dog kennel business. He testified that defendant "came to

[him] when she . . . [was] going through a divorce, she had no money [and] she

had no place to go." After she "begged [him] to take her in," plaintiff allowed

defendant to rent a barn. She was a tenant there for two years, paying her rent

timely.


1
  We use initials to protect the identity of victims of domestic violence and to
preserve the confidentiality of these proceedings. R. 1:38-3(d)(9) to -(10).


                                                                       A-4648-18T3
                                      2
      Defendant then moved into plaintiff's house with her two children in

2017. Plaintiff testified he "tried to be a father to these children," and he

"lend[ed] [defendant] money all the time" to support her and her children.

      In March 2019, they separated when plaintiff left his residence.

Recognizing that defendant's children "ha[d] to finish the school year,"

plaintiff let defendant and her children stay in his home while he lived "about a

mile up the street" with his secretary and her boyfriend. Plaintiff testified that

he was "not living in [his] house, cause [he was] afraid for [his] life with

[defendant]."

      On May 8, 2019, the parties argued over defendant parking a horse

trailer in the driveway of plaintiff's home. Plaintiff took issue with defendant

"bringing the trailer to the residential area" and worried that his grass would be

ruined. When plaintiff saw defendant trying to park the trailer, he stopped on

the driveway apron to block defendant. Defendant got out of her vehicle to

ask plaintiff to move, but when he refused, she allegedly "started hollering and

screaming" and called him a "f'in piece of shit." Defendant's daughter also got

out of the vehicle and told plaintiff to leave her mom alone. Defendant told

plaintiff she was calling the police, so he moved out of the way to let her park.




                                                                        A-4648-18T3
                                       3
      On May 10, 2019, plaintiff obtained a temporary restraining order (TRO)

against defendant alleging harassment and cyber harassment.         In the TRO,

plaintiff stated that in addition to the trailer incident, defendant filed a false

animal abuse complaint against him with the local health department and

posted false comments on Facebook about his business, alleging that he

medicated the dogs and did not walk or feed them enough. Under the prior

history of domestic violence section on the TRO, plaintiff reported that in

March 2019, defendant touched his buttocks approximately five times without

his consent.

      The FRO trial was scheduled for May 20, 2019, but on that date the

court issued a continuance order, stating that "pla[intiff's] failure to appear at

the next [trial] may result in dismissal." On May 29, 2019, plaintiff appeared

pro se while defendant was represented by counsel at trial.

      Both parties testified. While defendant denied calling plaintiff a "f-in

piece of shit" or touching him without his consent, she admitted to posting

negative comments about plaintiff's dog kennel business. She explained that

she saw about "[sixty] comments" on Facebook about defendant's business, so

she "added a comment to it as well" because she "wanted people to be aware of

what [she] knew" as "a firsthand witness to everything."


                                                                        A-4648-18T3
                                       4
       Plaintiff and defendant both introduced as exhibits images of these

comments, but the court did not admit them into evidence. Although plaintiff

brought his kennel manager and defendant brought her daughter to testify, the

court did not hear their testimony, concluding "it [was] not going to help the

[c]ourt make a decision."

       The court issued an oral decision granting plaintiff a FRO.              It

emphasized that because the parties dated and cohabitated, the PDVA was

applicable. While recognizing that harassment and cyber harassment do not

cover injury to an individual's business reputation, the court nevertheless

found that plaintiff established those predicate acts of violence because

defendant's motivation in harming plaintiff's business, "had to be for the

purpose of emotional distress" and defendant used offensive language against

him.   The court determined that although plaintiff initiated this domestic

violence matter as a means to evict defendant from his home after the

dismissal of his landlord/tenant action, defendant's actions and testimony were

"concerning," particularly her apparent admission that because she and

plaintiff did not have a written agreement, she was not going to leave his home

without a satisfactory arrangement.




                                                                      A-4648-18T3
                                      5
        The court noted that defendant had previously filed a domestic violence

complaint against plaintiff, but the application was denied because defendant

appeared to "us[e] [her] domestic violence complaint as a sword, and not as a

shield." Finding "serious concerns" as to defendant's intentions, motivation

and credibility in contrast to plaintiff who was "very credible[]," the court

concluded that a FRO was required to protect plaintiff from further harm or

abuse. The court also ordered defendant to vacate plaintiff's home by June 30,

2019.

        "We have a strictly limited standard of review from the fact-findings of

the Family Part judge." R.L.U. v. J.P.,  457 N.J. Super. 129, 134 (App. Div.

2018) (quoting N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. I.H.C.,  415 N.J. Super.
 551, 577 (App. Div. 2010)). Because a Family Part judge "possess[es] special

expertise in the field of domestic relations," we defer to those factual findings.

Cesare v. Cesare,  154 N.J. 394, 412 (1998). We defer also because Family

Part judges have the "opportunity to make first-hand credibility judgments

about the witnesses who appeared on the stand." R.L.U.,  457 N.J. Super. at
 134. When reviewing an FRO we "grant substantial deference to the trial

court's findings of fact and the legal conclusions based upon those findings."

D.N. v. K.M.,  429 N.J. Super. 592, 596 (App. Div. 2013).


                                                                        A-4648-18T3
                                       6
      We may, however, disturb the factual findings and legal conclusions of

the trial court if we are "convinced that they are so manifestly unsupported by

or inconsistent with the competent, relevant and reasonably credible evidence

as to offend the interests of justice." Cesare,  154 N.J. at 412 (quoting Rova

Farms Resort, Inc. v. Inv'rs Ins. Co.,  65 N.J. 474, 484 (1974)). Questions of

law are reviewed de novo. R.L.U.,  457 N.J. Super. at 134.

      "[D]omestic violence is a term of art which defines a pattern of abusive

and controlling behavior injurious to its victims." Jutchenko v. Jutchenko,  283 N.J. Super. 17, 20 (App. Div. 1995) (quoting Peranio v. Peranio,  280 N.J.

Super. 47, 52 (App. Div. 1995)). The PDVA defines domestic violence as the

occurrence of at least one of nineteen specific offenses.  N.J.S.A. 2C:25-19(a).

The court found defendant committed two such offenses.

                                A. Harassment.

      A person commits the offense of harassment

            if, with purpose to harass another, he [or she]:

            a. Makes, or causes to be made, a communication or
            communications anonymously or at extremely
            inconvenient hours, or in offensively coarse language,
            or any other manner likely to cause annoyance or
            alarm;

            b. Subjects another to striking, kicking, shoving, or
            other offensive touching, or threatens to do so; or

                                                                      A-4648-18T3
                                       7
            c. Engages in any other course of alarming conduct or
            of repeatedly committed acts with purpose to alarm or
            seriously annoy such other person.

            [ N.J.S.A. 2C:33-4(a) to -(c).]

When determining whether a defendant acted with the purpose to harass, a

court must be mindful that "a party may mask an intent to harass with what

could otherwise be an innocent act." J.D. v. M.D.F.,  207 N.J. 458, 488 (2011).

"A finding of a purpose to harass may be inferred from the evidence

presented," and a court may use "[c]ommon sense and experience" to

determine a defendant's intent. State v. Hoffman,  149 N.J. 564, 577 (1997).

Courts should consider the totality of the circumstances to determine whether

an underlying act of harassment in the context of domestic violence has

occurred. Id. at 584.

      Defendant argues on appeal that even if she did call plaintiff a "f-in

piece of shit," that comment in itself does not constitute domestic violence.

Having found plaintiff more credible than defendant, the court relied upon

plaintiff's testimony to determine "it appears to be language that [defendant]

uses, and it appears to be abusive and harassing." The court emphasized that

defendant's acknowledgement that she posted negative comments about

plaintiff's business on Facebook made "plain that her intention here [was] to


                                                                     A-4648-18T3
                                      8
harass and abuse [plaintiff]. [The posts] appear[ed] not to be intended to offer

friendly warnings to people. In fact, she[]          . . . complain[ed] about the

business that she testifie[d] she managed." The court found that the offensive

statement coupled with the Facebook posts, under all of the circumstances of

the parties' estrangement satisfied the elements of harassment.

      The trial court found that defendant selecting this time to raise concerns

online about plaintiff's dog kennel business after being aware of the alleged

conditions for about six years, demonstrates that she acted with a purpose to

harass. The trial court found "it[] [was] more likely than not that [defendant]

engaged in behavior repeatedly by posting, and in the driveway by using rude

and offensive language."

      The court acted within its discretion when determining that given "the

pride that [plaintiff] has . . . in the services that he offers [and] the pride that

he has in his reputation," that he explained took him ten years to build,

defendants' negative Facebook posts about plaintiff's business were alarming

and annoying to him, especially because plaintiff asserted that defendant's

comments were "entirely untrue."       Thus, plaintiff proved harassment under

 N.J.S.A. 2C:33-4 subsections (a) and (c).




                                                                          A-4648-18T3
                                        9
                             B. Cyber Harassment.

      Cyber harassment occurs when a person, acting with a purpose to harass,

"communicat[es] in an online capacity . . . and . . . (2) knowingly sends, posts,

comments, requests, suggests, or proposes any lewd, indecent, or obscene

material to or about a person with the intent to emotionally harm a reasonable

person or place a reasonable person in fear."  N.J.S.A. 2C:33-4.1(a)(2).

      The court emphasized that although "there's nothing [in the statute]

about using the internet to impair someone's business reputation, only to harm

someone emotionally," it "suppose[d]" the statute could be "strain[ed] to make

the argument that [the Facebook] posts were designed to cause harm to

[plaintiff's] property, and therefore, cause him emotional harm."       Because

"certainly harming a business had to be done for the purpose of emotional

distress," the court found plaintiff proved by the preponderance of the

evidence that defendant cyber harassed him.

      The court, however, failed to account for the "lewd, indecent, or obscene

material" element of the statute. See id. Without a showing that defendant's

Facebook posts satisfied one of those characteristics, causing emotional harm

to plaintiff was insufficient to satisfy a finding of cyber harassment. See State

v. Carroll,  456 N.J. Super. 520, 534-35 (App. Div. 2018) (holding "the trial


                                                                        A-4648-18T3
                                     10
court erred in finding probable cause for the cyber-harassment charge"

because, despite "[t]he Facebook posts [being] indisputably coarse and

insulting," they did not constitute "lewd, indecent, or obscene material").

Insufficient evidence was presented to support the predicate offense of cyber

harassment. Only one predicate offense, however, is required to enter an FRO

and plaintiff presented sufficient credible evidence for a finding of harassment,

if not cyber harassment.

                              C. Need for an FRO.

      When deciding whether to grant a FRO, the trial court has a "two -fold"

task. Silver,  387 N.J. Super. at 125. A court must first determine whether the

plaintiff can demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that the

defendant has committed a predicate act of violence under  N.J.S.A. 2C:25-

19(a). Ibid. If a predicate act is established, the court must then determine

"whether a restraining order is necessary, upon an evaluation of the factors set

forth in N.J.S.A. 2C: 25-29(a)(1) to -29(a)(6), to protect the victim from an

immediate danger or to prevent further abuse." Id. at 127.

      Under the second prong of Silver, a court "shall consider but not be

limited to" six factors, of which three are relevant here:




                                                                        A-4648-18T3
                                      11
                (1) The previous history of domestic violence between
                the plaintiff and defendant, including threats,
                harassment and physical abuse;

                (2) The existence of immediate danger to person or
                property;

                (3) The financial circumstances of the plaintiff and
                defendant.

                [ N.J.S.A. 2C:25-29(a)(1) to -(3).]

      When addressing this prong in its oral decision, the court noted it was

"frankly struggling" to determine whether plaintiff needed a FRO. The court

explained that defendant "appear[ed] to be saying . . . [he was] using this

[domestic violence matter] as a way to evict [defendant] from [his] home," but

"[o]n the other hand, [the court found] a clear pattern of conduct by [plaintiff]

that [was] designed to cause injury, harm, emotional and otherwise to

[plaintiff]."

      The court interpreted plaintiff's testimony that she would "need help to

move out" by July 1 because she "can't do it alone" to mean that plaintiff had

"no intention of leaving [plaintiff's] home" and was "going to continue to stay .

. . [and] take advantage of what [plaintiff was] permitting [her] to take

advantage of . . . by staying."       This testimony "sort of capped it for [the

court]," and was the final reason why the FRO was granted.


                                                                        A-4648-18T3
                                        12
       Although an FRO may be granted "in the absence of . . . a pattern [or

history of abuse] where there is 'one sufficiently egregious action,'" Silver,  387 N.J. Super. at 128 (quoting Cesare,  154 N.J. at 402), here the offense of

harassment was not sufficiently egregious. The court failed to consider the

relevant N.J.S.A. 25-29(a) factors in its decision and thus, without further

findings, its determination to issue an FRO was a misguided exercise of

discretion.

       We therefore remand for the court to hold a hearing, with the parties'

participation, to determine whether an FRO is necessary after considering the

appropriate statutory and other factors.     The court may choose to accept

additional testimony. We note that plaintiff did not participate in this appeal.

Having removed defendant from his premises through the domestic violence

proceedings a year ago, plaintiff may no longer believe he is in need of an

FRO.

       Reversed and remanded. We do not retain jurisdiction.




                                                                        A-4648-18T3
                                      13

Tuesday, May 26, 2020

Grandparent visitation discussed

Grandparent visitation discussed
K.D.,
                                             APPROVED FOR PUBLICATION
        Plaintiff-Appellant,
                                                     March 5, 2020

v.                                               APPELLATE DIVISION


A.S.,

     Defendant-Respondent.
__________________________
Argued January 23, 2020 – Decided March 5, 2020 Before Judges Fuentes, Mayer and Enright. On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Chancery Division, Family Part, Ocean County, Docket No. FD-15-0550-19. nOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
                 APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

                                      SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
                                      APPELLATE DIVISION
                                      DOCKET NO. A-3543-18T4
The opinion of the court was delivered by ENRIGHT, J.S.C. (temporarily assigned). In this case, we are asked to determine whether a child's biological mother, who entered an identified surrender of her parental rights to her biological mother, the child's maternal grandmother, has standing as the child's legal sibling, per N.J.S.A. 9:2-7.1, to seek visitation rights against a non- relative adoptive mother. Stated differently, do biological parents who enter an identified surrender of their children to their biological parents become their children's legal siblings? We are satisfied the answer is no. As our Supreme Court made clear in Moriarty v. Bradt, 177 N.J. 84, 114-15 (2003) and reaffirmed in Major v. Maguire, 224 N.J. 1, 6 (2016), N.J.S.A. 9:2-7.1 is subject to strict scrutiny because this statute intrudes on a parent's fundamental right to raise a child as that parent sees fit. Permitting biological parents, who knowingly and voluntarily enter identified surrenders of their parental rights, to acquire the legal rights of siblings pursuant to N.J.S.A. 9:2-7.1 would ignore the Supreme Court's admonition in Moriarty and Major, and cause needless disruption and apprehension to countless families who have opened their homes and their hearts to children in need of adoption. A-3543-18T4 2 I We summarize the salient procedural history and facts of this highly idiosyncratic and litigious case in order to give context to our legal analysis. Plaintiff K.D. appeals from the March 7, 2019 denial of her request to continue visitation with her biological son, Sam, against the wishes of his non - relative adoptive mother, defendant A.S.1 K.D. also appeals from the February 8, 2019 order granting amicus status to the Division of Child Protection and Permanency (Division). We affirm. Sam was born in 2006. He was diagnosed with Autism Spectrum Disorder with combined repetitive and expressive language disorder, developmental fine motor coordination disorder and attention deficit hyperactivity disorder. The Division removed Sam from his mother's care at age three, after he was found crying in the middle of an intersection, while K.D. was intoxicated. K.D. and Sam's biological father 2 entered into identified surrenders to allow Sam to be placed with his maternal grandmother, A.D. Once K.D.'s parental rights were terminated, along with those of Sam's biological father, 1 We use fictitious names for the child and initials for the adults to protect the privacy of the parties and the minor involved in this matter. R. 1:38-3(d)(12). 2 Sam's biological father is not involved in the instant appeal. A-3543-18T4 3 A.D. adopted Sam in March 2012. Unfortunately, A.D. passed away six weeks after adopting Sam. Carolyn, Sam's biological sister, agreed to care for him. However, this arrangement proved to be short lived. A few months after A.D.'s death, Carolyn advised the Division she was unable to care for her special needs brother on a permanent basis. She agreed to temporarily care for him until the Division found a suitable permanent placement. In May 2013, Sam was placed in A.S.'s care, where he remains. K.D. engaged in treatment for her alcoholism after her parental rights were terminated. In June 2014, K.D. filed a motion pursuant to Rule 4:50-1 to set aside her identified surrender in her guardianship action in Hudson County and to vacate the judgment of adoption granted to A.D. in Middlesex County. On January 9, 2015, the motion judge in Hudson County denied K.D.'s application to set aside her identified surrender and directed her to prosecute her application to vacate A.D.'s adoption in Middlesex County. K.D. appealed the order issued by the Hudson County judge. Sam remained in A.S.'s care during the pendency of K.D.'s appeal. Consistent with the Family Part decision in Hudson County, K.D. filed an application in Middlesex County to vacate Sam's adoption by A.D. The Family Part in Middlesex County heard and denied K.D.'s application to vacate the adoption as well as her motion for reconsideration. The Middlesex County A-3543-18T4 4 judge memorialized these decisions in orders dated February 27, 2015 and April 13, 2015, respectively. Before the Family Part judge in Middlesex County denied K.D.'s motion for reconsideration, K.D. moved before this court to supplement the record in her appeal of the order entered by Hudson County Family Part judge. In an order dated June 3, 2015, this court denied K.D.'s motion without prejudice and "temporarily remand[ed] the matter to the trial court for the limited purpose of allowing [K.D.] to file a Rule 4:50 motion in the trial court based upon [an] alternative theory of changed circumstances." This court also retained jurisdiction and directed the parties and the Hudson County Family Part judge to complete all the necessary proceedings within ninety days. The motion judge adhered to this court's directions and timeframe and after employing the two-prong test from In re Guardianship of J.N.H., 172 N.J. 440, 474-75 (2002), the judge found K.D. had presented sufficient evidence of changed circumstances. However, the motion judge also found K.D. did not prove it was in Sam's best interests to change his placement or to return him to K.D.'s care and custody. K.D. thereafter amended her notice of appeal to include this final decision by the Family Part in Hudson County and the orders issued by the Family Part in Middlesex County denying her application to vacate the adoption. A-3543-18T4 5 On June 1, 2017, this court affirmed the order entered by the Family Part judge in Hudson County that "reject[ed] [K.D.'s] challenges to the orders denying her post-judgment attempts to set aside the voluntary surrender of her parental rights in favor of [A.D.]" N.J. Div. of Child Prot. & Permanency v. K.D., Nos. A-2651-14 and A-5513-14 (App. Div. June 1, 2017) (slip op. at 10). We also "conclude[ed] that the Middlesex [County] judge properly denied the motion to set aside the judgment of adoption." Id. at 12. In reaching this decision, we expressly held K.D. had not demonstrated that her "voluntary surrender was ineffectual to terminate her parental rights or that it is inequitable to further enforce the April 27, 2011 guardianship judgment." Ibid. Finally, although not raised as an issue in the appeal, our colleagues took an extra step to point out the following: This brings us to the October 1, 2012 order, which posthumously terminated [A.D.'s] parental rights. Although [K.D.'s] appeals in the guardianship and adoptions matters do not implicate this order, which was entered in a separate matter not before us for review, we cannot ignore the fact that this order suffers from the same disabilities found in defendant's motion to vacate the judgment of adoption. There is no evidence that notice was given to [A.D.'s] personal representative or to [K.D.], who, upon [A.D.'s] adoption of the child, had become in the eyes of the law the child's sibling. And the Division's application sought relief the court was not empowered to give: the termination of parental rights of a deceased parent. A-3543-18T4 6 The issue resolved by that court had been rendered purely academic; any debate about [A.D.'s] parental rights ended with her death. [Id. at 12-13 (emphasis added).] A.S. adopted Sam on December 3, 2018. As noted earlier, Sam began residing with his adoptive mother in May 2013, when he was six years old. He is now fourteen. Although the Family Part authorized K.D. to have limited visitation rights before A.S. adopted Sam, A.S. decided not to continue the visits after the adoption became final. K.D. filed an order to show cause on December 11, 2018, seeking to reinstate her visits over A.S.'s objection. A Family Part judge in Ocean County denied K.D.'s application for emergent relief. Although not a party in the case, the Division opposed K.D.'s application to have visitation rights to Sam and moved to intervene. The court denied the Division's motion to intervene but granted its supplemental application to appear and participate as amicus curiae. On March 7, 2019, the judge heard oral argument on K.D.'s application to reinstate regular visits with Sam and also heard A.S.'s cross-motion to dismiss. Because the parties presented documentary evidence which was outside the four corners of the factual allegations in the pleadings, the judge sua sponte decided to treat A.S.'s dismissal application as a motion for summary judgment under Rule 4:46-2(c). A-3543-18T4 7 The judge analyzed K.D.'s request for visitation under certain legal frameworks, including: her status as the child's biological mother whose parental rights had been terminated under Title 30; a legal sibling, pursuant to N.J.S.A. 9:2-7.1; and a psychological parent. See V.C. v. M.J.B., 163 N.J. 200, 223 (2000). The judge concluded that none of these analytical paradigms created the "exceptional circumstances" necessary for the court's intervention. Moriarty, 177 N.J. at 114. He further found that under any of these paradigms, K.D. failed to establish a prima facie case that visitation with Sam was necessary to avoid harm to the child. Accordingly, the judge determined there was no need for an evidentiary hearing and he denied K.D.'s request to compel visits over A.S.'s objection. K.D. filed this appeal after we denied her application for emergent review. II On appeal, K.D. argues the judge's denial of her visitation motion, without conducting a plenary hearing, constitutes error. Moreover, she contends the judge erred in allowing the Division amicus status. We disagree. We start our analysis by addressing whether K.D. became Sam's sibling "in the eyes of the law" upon A.D.'s adoption of Sam, as mentioned by our colleagues in their June 1, 2017 unpublished opinion. We are satisfied our colleagues' reference to K.D.'s sibling status is not legally binding on us based A-3543-18T4 8 on two separate grounds. First, this legal "characterization" of K.D. was indisputably dictum. Indeed, our colleagues acknowledged in their 2017 opinion that such commentary pertained "[to] a separate matter not before us for review." K.D., at 12. It is well-settled that "[d]ictum is a statement by a judge 'not necessary to the decision then being made[,]' and 'as such it is entitled to due consideration but does not invoke the principle of stare decisis.'" Bandler v. Melillo, 443 N.J. Super. 203, 210 (App. Div. 2015) (quoting Jamouneau v. Div. of Tax Appeals, 2 N.J. 325, 332 (1949)) (alteration in original). Second, as Rule 1:36-3 makes clear, "[n]o unpublished opinion shall constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." There are profound public policy ramifications to characterizing K.D. as the legal sibling of her biological son under these circumstances. We begin our discussion of this extraordinarily delicate area of law, mindful of our Supreme Court's admonition in In re D.C.: Our law recognizes the family as a bastion of autonomous privacy in which parents, presumed to act in the best interests of their children, are afforded self- determination over how those children are raised. All of the attributes of a biological family are applicable in the case of adoption; adoptive parents are free, within the same limits as biological parents, to raise their children as they see fit, including choices regarding religion, education, and association. However, the right to parental autonomy is not absolute, and a biological family may be ordered to permit third-party visitation, over its objections, where A-3543-18T4 9 it is necessary under the exercise of our parents patriae jurisdiction to avoid harm to the child. That principle governs adoptive families as well. [ 203 N.J. 545, 551-52 (2010).] As a "parent is entitled to a presumption that he or she acts in the best interests of the child, . . . the parent's determination whether to permit visitation is entitled to 'special weight.'" Major, 224 N.J. at 15 (citing Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 67-69 (2000)). Thus, "the need to avoid harm to the child is 'the only [S]tate interest warranting the invocation of the State's parens patriae jurisdiction to overcome the presumption in favor of a parent's decision and to force [third-party] visitation over the wishes of a fit parent[.]'" Id. at 16 (quoting Moriarty, 177 N.J. at 115) (second alteration in original). "[A]bsent a showing that the child would suffer harm if deprived of contact with [the third party], the State [can]not constitutionally infringe on parental autonomy." Ibid. (citing Moriarty, 177 N.J. at 115). When the third party does demonstrate such harm, the presumption in favor of parental decision-making is overcome, and the parent is then obliged to offer a visitation schedule that is in the child's best interest. Id. at 17. These principles are applicable to the instant matter, as "[a]ll of the attributes of a biological family are applicable in the case of adoption." D.C., 203 N.J. at 551. A-3543-18T4 10 On appeal, K.D. renews her argument that Sam will suffer harm if he is not permitted visits with her and she relies on the case of Kattermann v. Di Piazza, 151 N.J. Super. 209 (App. Div. 1977) to support her request for post - adoption visits. Her argument is unavailing. As the Family Part judge aptly recognized, the Kattermann court applied a now outdated best interests standard to factual circumstances distinguishable from the case at hand. Further, as the Moriarty Court made clear, "interference with parental autonomy will be tolerated only to avoid harm to the health or welfare of a child." Moriarty, 177 N.J. at 115. Moreover, almost a decade ago, the D.C. Court confirmed the best interests standard should not be utilized in third - party, post-adoption visitation disputes, noting: the application of the best interests standard to a third party's petition for visitation is an affront to the family's right to privacy and autonomy and . . . interference with a biological or adoptive family's decision-making can only be justified on the basis of the exercise of our parens patriae jurisdiction to avoid harm to the child. [D.C., 203 N.J. at 573 (emphasis added).] Therefore, a third party seeking to compel contact with a child over an adoptive parent's wishes must meet the threshold burden of proving by a preponderance of evidence that the child will suffer harm without the contact. In fact, the moving party must demonstrate "a particular identifiable harm, A-3543-18T4 11 specific to the child." Mizrahi v. Cannon, 375 N.J. Super. 221, 234 (App. Div. 2005). As the D.C. Court confirmed, "an adoptive family is not entitled to greater protections than a biological family. Thus, to the extent that visitation by a third party may be compelled over the objections of a biological family, the same rule applies to an adoptive family." 203 N.J. at 570. Clearly, then, it is settled law that siblings by adoption have the same legal rights as biological siblings. Guided by these principles, we review the Grandparent and Sibling Visitation Statute, which provides in relevant part: A grandparent or any sibling of a child residing in this State may make application before the Superior Court, in accordance with the Rules of Court, for an order for visitation. It shall be the burden of the applicant to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the granting of visitation is in the best interests of the child. [N.J.S.A. 9:2-7.1(a).] Accordingly, the question here is whether K.D. became Sam's legal sibling when she voluntarily agreed to surrender her parental rights to Sam's maternal grandmother. If so, she can pursue her rights as a sibling under N.J.S.A. 9:2-7.1(a). We hold that to recognize K.D. as the legal sibling of her biological son under these circumstances would violate the public policy underpinning the A-3543-18T4 12 Division's role under Title 30. We are also satisfied that the Legislature did not intend to sanction such an outcome when it adopted N.J.S.A. 9:2-7.1. N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a) allows a court to permanently sever the legal relationship between a parent and child only after the court comes to the consequential decision that a child's welfare has been or will continue to be endangered by the parental relationship and "proof of parental unfitness is clear." N.J. Div. of Youth & Fam. Servs. v. F.M., 211 N.J. 420, 447 (2012); see In re Adoption of Child by J.E.V., 442 N.J. Super. 472, 481 (App. Div. 2015) (confirming that "[a]fter the elimination of the death penalty, we can think of no legal consequence of greater magnitude than the termination of parental rights."). Here, K.D.'s decision to enter a voluntary surrender of her parental rights to her biological son in favor of the child's maternal grandmother permanently and irrevocably severed all of her legally cognizable familial rights to her son. Thus, K.D. does not fall within the class of litigants empowered to bring a summary action under N.J.S.A. 9:2-7.1. Stated differently, K.D. does not have standing to bring a visitation action in the Family Part under N.J.S.A. 9:2-7.1 because she is not her biological son's legal sibling. As we have acknowledged, "[a]n adoptive family must be given the right to grow and develop as an autonomous family, and must not be tied to the very relationship A-3543-18T4 13 that put the child in the position of being adopted." In re Adoption of a Child by W.P., 163 N.J. 158, 175 (2000). A contrary ruling would consign adoptive parents to an inferior status. Ibid.; see Mimkon v. Ford, 66 N.J. 426, 441 (1975) (Clifford, J., dissenting). Next, we acknowledge that an adoptive parent may voluntarily permit a child to maintain contact with a biological parent. See In re Guardianship of D.M.H., 161 N.J. 365 (1999). However, as the motion judge recognized, granting K.D. legal standing to bring a visitation action as a biological parent would create the functional equivalent of an open adoption. Our Supreme Court has made clear that the subject of open adoptions "represents a significant policy issue which should be addressed in separate legislation." In re Adoption of a Child by D.M.H., 135 N.J. 473, 494 (1994) (quoting Senate Judiciary Committee, Statement to Senate, Bill No. 685 (1993)). Accordingly, unless otherwise decided by the Legislature, the judiciary has no authority to compel A.S. to permit contact between K.D. and Sam based on K.D.'s biological connection to Sam or her identified surrender to Sam's maternal grandparent. For the sake of completeness, we also find no basis to disturb either the motion judge's determination that K.D. does not meet the criteria to be considered Sam's psychological parent or his decision that no evidentiary hearing was required. A-3543-18T4 14 Finally, K.D. contends the Family Part judge erred in granting the Division amicus status and improperly relied on the Division's factual assertions. Again, we disagree. Rule 1:13-9 provides that a court "shall grant the motion [for leave to appear as amicus curiae] if it is satisfied under all the circumstances that the motion is timely, the applicant's participation will assist in the resolution of an issue of public importance, and no party to the litigation will be unduly prejudiced thereby." The order must then define the permitted extent of participation of amicus. Ibid. The Division's "statutory mission is to protect the health and welfare of the children of this state." N.J. Div. of Youth & Fam. Servs. v. E.B., 137 N.J. 180, 184 (1994) (citing N.J.S.A. 30:4C-4). "Traditionally, the role of amicus curiae was to be advisory rather than adverse." In re State ex rel. Essex Cty. Prosecutor's Off., 427 N.J. Super. 1, 5 (Law Div. 2012) (citing Casey v. Male, 63 N.J. Super. 255, 258 (Cty. Ct. 1960)). However, the Third Circuit held that amicus need not be impartial, and that even when parties are very well represented, amicus "may provide important assistance to the court." Neonatology Assocs., P.A. v. Comm'r, 293 F.3d 128, 132 (3d Cir. 2002). Further, "Rule 1:13-9 has been interpreted as establishing 'a liberal standard for permitting amicus appearances.'" In re State ex rel. Essex Cty. Prosecutor's A-3543-18T4 15 Off., 427 N.J. Super. at 5 (quoting Pfizer, Inc. v. Dir., Div. of Tax'n, 23 N.J. Tax 421, 424 (Tax 2007)). Here, the judge determined the Division could participate as amicus but specified its participation was limited to "the issue of post[-]adoption visitation by a third party, inclusive of any collateral issue raised by the parties." We are satisfied he did not abuse his discretion in this regard, particularly given the Division's involvement with Sam from 2009 onward. While the Division's position was adverse to K.D.'s post-adoption application, this lone fact did not preclude the Division's involvement as amicus. Family courts have special expertise in family matters and "appellate courts should accord deference to family court factfinding." Cesare v. Cesare, 154 N.J. 394, 413 (1998). "Therefore, an appellate court should not disturb the 'factual findings and legal conclusions of the trial judge unless [it is] convinced that they are so manifestly unsupported by or inconsistent with the competent, relevant and reasonably credible evidence as to offend the interests of justice.'" Id. at 412 (quoting Rova Farms Resort, Inc. v. Inv'rs. Ins. Co., 65 N.J. 474, 484 (1974)) (alteration in original). However, "[a] trial court's interpretation of the law and the legal consequences that flow from established facts are not entitled to any special deference." Manalapan Realty, LP v. Manalapan Twp. Comm., 140 N.J. 366, 378 (1995) (citations omitted). A-3543-18T4 16 Governed by these standards, we are satisfied the record amply supports the motion judge's factual findings. Considering those findings, as well as the legal principles we have highlighted, we perceive no basis to disturb the judge's decision to deny K.D. post-adoption visits without the necessity of an evidentiary hearing. To the extent we have not addressed K.D.'s remaining arguments, we find them lacking in merit. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E). Affirmed.

Friday, April 24, 2020

Former caregiver deemed household member under DV law M.S. v. D.H.

Former caregiver deemed household member under DV law M.S. v. D.H.


Defendant appealed from the final restraining order entered against him and in favor of plaintiff. Plaintiff had hired defendant as a caregiver for plaintiff's autistic 23-year-old son, J.S., who had a history of violent outbursts. As a result, defendant lived with plaintiff and J.S. until plaintiff terminated defendant's employment. Plaintiff then filed a complaint for a restraining order against defendant, alleging defendant committed acts of harassment. Specifically, plaintiff alleged that defendant made death threats against plaintiff, demanded long-term employment contracts, and pressured plaintiff into purchasing a property. Plaintiff alleged that defendant was "weaponizing" J.S. against plaintiff by influencing J.S. to be hostile and violent towards plaintiff. Plaintiff stated that he was frightened by defendant, alleging that defendant had described himself as ex-military and had also shown plaintiff his heavily-stocked gun locker. In his defense, defendant claimed that the statements referred to his belief that plaintiff and J.S. would not be able to live together without harming each other and his threats were "benign threats" to sue for compensation for injuries he suffered from J.S.'s attacks. Defendant also presented testimony from neighbors about the positive impact defendant had on J.S. The trial court granted the FRO, noting that the parties had lived together for a year and defendant continued to care for J.S., necessitating future contact between the parties. The trial court found plaintiff's testimony about the predicate acts of harassment credible and rejected defendant's explanation for his statements. On appeal, the court affirmed entry of the FRO. The court first held that defendant, as a former live-in caregiver, qualified as a "household member" under the PDVA. The court further held that the record supported the trial court's conclusion that defendant's statements and threats to plaintiff constituted the predicate act of harassment, and that a FRO was necessary to protect plaintiff given defendant's access to weapons.
source https://www.law.com/njlawjournal/almID/1585202909NJA154818T/