palimony rejected against estate in this case SOSKINA, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. THE ESTATE OF ALEXANDER TURYAN,

palimony rejected against estate in this case

INNA SOSKINA,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

THE ESTATE OF ALEXANDER TURYAN,

ANNA TURYAN,

Defendants,

and

EDWARD TURYAN,

Defendant-Appellant.

__________________________________

October 3, 2016

Unpublished

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-0 

Before Judges Reisner, Koblitz and Sumners.

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Chancery Division, Family Part, Bergen County, Docket No. FM-02-0915-11.

Roger L. Fidler, attorney for appellant. 

Antranig Aslanian, Jr., attorney for respondent.

PER CURIAM

Edward Turyan appeals from Family Part orders dated January 5, 2015 and March 4, 2015. We affirm substantially for the reasons stated by Judge Bonnie J. Mizdol in her comprehensive written opinions dated January 5, 2015, and March 4, 2015. We add these comments. 

This appeal arises from litigation filed by Inna Soskina against the estate of her long-time paramour Alexander Turyan, seeking palimony and other monetary relief. After a twenty-four day bench trial, Judge Mizdol denied the palimony claim but granted other relief, including about $94,000, representing the return of Soskina's $20,000 loan to Alexander¹ to buy a Florida condominium, plus twenty percent of the net profit from the sale of the condo; and $300,000 that Alexander directed one of his debtors to repay directly to Soskina but which defendants converted to their own use. The judge also ordered Edward and co-defendant Anna Turyan to pay Soskina about $50,000 in counsel fees.²

On this appeal we will not disturb the trial judge's factual findings so long as they are supported by substantial credible evidence.  Cesare v. Cesare, 154 N.J. 394, 412 (1998). We owe particular deference to the judge's evaluation of witness credibility.  Ibid. We review the trial judge's evidentiary rulings for abuse of discretion.  Estate of Hanges v. Metro Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 202 N.J. 369, 374 (2010). We will disturb a trial judge's award of counsel fees only in the rarest of circumstances and only for a "clear abuse of discretion."  Strahan v. Strahan, 402 N.J. Super. 298, 317 (App. Div. 2008).

After reviewing the voluminous trial transcripts and documentary evidence, we find no basis to disturb Judge Mizdol's detailed credibility determinations or her factual findings. Based on the facts as she found them to be, her legal conclusions on the issues of liability and damages are unassailable. We find no abuse of discretion in her evidentiary rulings or in the award of counsel fees. 

On this appeal, Edward raises four issues:

I. THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS AND/OR LACHES BARS RECOVERY ON ALLEGED CONTRACT TO LOAN MONIES TO DECEDENT TO BUY FLORIDA CONDOMINIUM.

II. NO FACTUAL BASIS EXISTS FOR HOLDING THAT FUNDS INVESTED BY VLADIMIR PANTELEYEEV COMPRISED FUNDS OWED [TO] DECEDENT.

III. COURT ABUSED DISCRETION ALLOWING TESTIMONY BY NOTARY REGARDING DECEDENT'S CAPACITY TO EXECUTE AGREEMENT WHILE BARRING TESTIMONY FROM PHYSICIAN(S) ON SAME ISSUE.

IV. THE AWARD OF ATTORNEY'S FEES WAS NOT PROPERLY COMPUTED.

Having reviewed the record in light of the applicable law, we conclude that those arguments are not supported by the record and, except as briefly addressed below, they are without sufficient merit to warrant discussion in a written opinion.  R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E). 

Based on a written, signed document, the judge found that Soskina contributed $20,000 to the down payment on the Florida condo, in return for which Alexander agreed to repay her the $20,000, plus twenty percent of the net profit, when the condo was sold. At the trial, Edward contended that Soskina settled her claim to the return of her $20,000 and a percentage of the sale proceeds. In her comprehensive opinion, Judge Mizdol rejected that contention for reasons which we find persuasive and supported by substantial credible evidence. Notably, the judge found no written documentation that a $29,000 check from Alexander to Soskina, which she never cashed, was intended as a settlement of her claims concerning the condo. The judge also found it inconceivable that Alexander, an astute business person who routinely documented important transactions, would fail to document the settlement of such a significant financial claim. We find no basis to disturb the judge's conclusion. 

Although the condo was not sold until 2012, defendant now contends that any breach of the agreement occurred in 1995 and that Soskina's claim is barred by the statute of limitations. That argument was not raised in the trial court, and even if considered, is patently without merit. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E); Nieder v. Royal Indem. Ins. Co., 62 N.J. 229, 234 (1973). 

The next issue concerns Alexander's deathbed direction that a business associate named Vladimir Pantaleev should satisfy a $300,000 debt he owned to Alexander, by paying that sum to Soskina. The direction was repeated orally in front of multiple witnesses and was memorialized in writing. However, instead of paying $300,000 to Soskina, Pantaleev paid the sum of $359,000 to Edward and Anna. Based on her evaluation of witness credibility, Judge Mizdol found that this sum included the $300,000 that Pantaleev owed to Alexander, and that Edward and Anna unlawfully converted the money to their own use. Judge Mizdol found incredible defendants' claim that the money represented a new business investment, for which there was no documentation. 

On this appeal, Edward argues that the trial evidence did not support the finding that Pantaleev paid Edward and Anna the $300,000 he was supposed to have paid to plaintiff. He claims the $300,000 was merely an investment in other businesses, and he denies that Pantaleev owed Alexander the sum of $300,000. Edward's arguments are based on testimony which the judge did not find credible. His contentions on this point were thoroughly addressed in Judge Mizdol's opinion and are without sufficient merit to warrant further discussion here.  R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E). 

Edward next argues that he was unfairly precluded from calling medical witnesses who were not on his witness list. He does not cite to the record concerning any proffer of medical testimony, and as a result has not properly presented the claim on this appeal. He further contends that the judge should not have let the hospital's notary testify about her observations of Alexander's mental capacity at the time he signed the directive concerning Pantaleev's debt. There was no objection to that testimony, some of which was elicited by Edward's trial attorney. We find no abuse of the judge's discretion in letting the notary testify.³

Affirmed. 

1  For clarity, and intending no disrespect, we refer to all members of the Turyan family by their first names.

2  The complaint named Alexander's brother Edward, in his personal capacity and as personal representative for Alexander's estate in Florida, and Alexander's daughter Anna, as executrix of Alexander's estate and in her personal capacity. Edward is the sole appellant. Soskina did not cross-appeal from the denial of her palimony claim. 

3  In one short paragraph, Edward contends that because the damages award was incorrect, the counsel fee award must be revisited as, he argues, it was based on a percentage of the damages. Both of those assertions are incorrect. Damages were correctly awarded, and Judge Mizdol properly based the fee award on a detailed analysis of the factors set forth in Rule 5:3-5(c).