R.B.,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
P.B.,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________________
P.B.,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
R.B.,
Defendant-Respondent.
_________________________________________________________
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NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
A-5072-10T1
Submitted
April 18, 2012 - Decided
Before
Judges Graves and Koblitz.
On
appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey,
Chancery
Division, Family Part, Morris County,
Docket
Nos. FV-14-008400-11 and FV-14-001168-11.
Janet
L. Porro, attorney for appellant P.B.
(Ms.
Porro and Janet S. Del Gaizo, on the brief).
Legal
Services of Northwest Jersey, attorneys
for
respondent R.B. (Andrea L. Strack, of counsel
and
on the brief).
PER CURIAM
In
these consolidated matters, P.B. appeals from a final restraining order (FRO)
entered against him on March 7, 2011, pursuant to the Prevention of Domestic
Violence Act, N.J.S.A. 2C:25-17 to -35, and a subsequent order denying
his request for a temporary restraining order (TRO) against R.B.,[1]
his wife. We affirm.
The
parties were going through a divorce when R.B. filed a domestic violence
complaint and obtained a TRO on March 3, 2011. The complaint recited a prior history of
domestic violence and alleged the predicate offense of harassment. N.J.S.A. 2C:33-4. The parties were the only witnesses to
testify at the final hearing, which took place on March 7, 2011.
Respondent
testified she was "very scared" after she received a series of threatening
emails from appellant on February 11, 2011. In one of the emails, appellant stated:
Again, don't take this lightly or think that it's
just an idle threat. You have one last
chance to save yourself, and considering what an asshole you are, I shouldn't
even give this to you. Blow me off this
time and I promise you, you'll regret it for the rest of your life. That is not a threat . . . it's a promise.
In
another email, appellant stated:
I begged you to go to the counselor for one reason
only, so you could be saved. John[2]
knows what is going to happen to you and he was in on this. It was his idea to see if he could save you,
when he saw how hard it was for me to destroy you.
Following
her receipt of the emails, respondent received several telephone calls from her
husband. According to respondent, her
husband told her she "brought all this upon [herself]" and she would
"have to pay for the pain that [she] caused him." In addition, appellant told her she
"ruined his life" and "it's time to pay."
Respondent
also testified that while she was employed by an accounting firm, someone sent her
employer an anonymous letter accusing her of tax fraud and other criminal
conduct. Appellant admitted at trial
that he sent the unsigned letter to his wife's employer. The letter, dated February 22, 2011, reads as
follows:
Enclosed please find a copy of the complaint that
has been filed with the New Jersey State Board of Accountancy against Ms.
[R.B.]. This complaint copy is being
provided to you as Ms. [B.] is presently in your employ as an accountant.
This complaint details evidence of numerous civil
and criminal violations by Ms. [B.].
These violations include:
∙
Federal tax fraud
∙
N.J. State tax fraud
∙
U.S. Treasury Foreign Bank and Financial Accounts (FBAR) violations
∙
Violation of the United States Bank Secrecy Act
∙
Violation of Tax Preparer Conduct as defined by IRS's Office of
Professional
Responsibility
As you have now been provided with notice of the
charges against Ms. [B.], be aware that continuing to employ her may expose
your firm to substantial liability. As a
forensic accountant . . . Ms. [B.]'s work has been an important part of the
financial evidence in many legal cases.
Since she was committing tax fraud and other violations during this
time, the veracity of her work might come into question, should clients learn
of this matter. Please govern yourself
accordingly.
Respondent
testified that all of the allegations in the letter were false. Moreover, when appellant was asked why he
sent the letter to his wife's employer, he claimed he was trying to protect himself
from liability by disclosing "to as many people as possible" that he "might
have uncovered a crime."
In
an oral decision, the trial court found that respondent "testified
credibly"; the email communications sent by appellant were intended to
cause "emotional distress and to coerce [R.B.] to do things like going to
a counselor"; and the anonymous letter to his wife's employer was part of a
course of conduct designed "to scuttle her career." The court further found appellant's
explanation for the letter was not credible, and respondent was entitled to a
FRO to prevent further acts of harassment.
On
appeal, appellant argues: (1) his wife
abused the Prevention of Domestic Violence Act in order to gain an advantage in
the parties' custody dispute involving their two children; (2) respondent's
proofs were insufficient to establish that a restraining order was necessary to
protect her from immediate danger and further abuse; and (3) his conduct did
not constitute harassment. After
considering these arguments in light of the record and the applicable law, we
have concluded they are clearly without merit, Rule 2:11-3(e)(1)(E), and
we affirm with only the following comments.
The
scope of our review is limited. A trial
court's findings "are binding on appeal when supported by adequate,
substantial, credible evidence." Cesare
v. Cesare, 154 N.J. 394, 412 (1998).
"[A]n appellate court should not disturb the 'factual findings and
legal conclusions of the trial judge unless [it is] convinced that they are so
manifestly unsupported by or inconsistent with the competent, relevant and
reasonably credible evidence as to offend the interests of justice.'" Ibid. (alteration in original)
(quoting Rova Farms Resort, Inc. v. Investors Ins. Co. of Am., 65 N.J.
474, 484 (1974)). In this case, the
trial court's findings and conclusions are supported by substantial credible
evidence, and we affirm substantially for the reasons stated by Judge Thomas
Critchley on March 7, 2011.
We
also reject appellant's argument that the trial court erred in denying his
request for a TRO. During a hearing on
June 3, 2011, appellant testified he was charged with reckless driving as a
result of an incident mentioned in his domestic violence complaint. Appellant also testified he did not
"have the paperwork from the charges." Due to the court's concern
that domestic violence complaints "can be used as a sword as well as a
shield," Judge Critchley denied the request for a TRO. However, the judge stated he would request
additional information from the police department and would "revisit"
the matter if there was a need to do so.
Under these circumstances, we find no abuse of discretion or reversible
error.
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