MEYERS V. TERSIGNI A-6140-09T4 June 20, 2011

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-6140-09T4

Submitted May 25, 2011 – Decided June 20, 2011

DAWN MEYERS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. WILLIAM C. TERSIGNI, Defendant-Respondent.

Before Judges Ashrafi and Nugent.

On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey, Chancery Division, Family Part, Hunterdon County, Docket No. FD-10-247-91.

Dawn Meyers, appellant pro se.

Respondent has not filed a brief.

PER CURIAM

Plaintiff Dawn Meyers, representing herself, appeals from a June 8, 2010 Family Part order that denied her motion to "unemancipate" the parties' then twenty-one-year-old daughter and to require defendant William C. Tersigni to pay child support. We affirm.

The parties have one child, born in 1988, who lived with plaintiff. The last support order entered before the child was emancipated was entered on August 8, 2008, and required, among other things, that defendant pay plaintiff $873.60 for his share of their daughter's 2007 health insurance; $509.29 for defendant's share of their daughter's 2008 health insurance to date; and $74.69 per month toward their daughter's health insurance coverage for the remainder of 2008.

Defendant subsequently filed a motion to emancipate their daughter, and plaintiff filed a cross-motion seeking to require defendant to pay child support until their daughter graduated from college. On January 16, 2009, the Family Part granted defendant's motion and entered an order emancipating the parties' daughter; terminating defendant's child support obligation as of November 12, 2008, the date defendant filed the motion requesting emancipation; and requiring defendant to pay child support arrearages by February 20, 2009. The Family Court supported its decision with a written memorandum in which it explained that the parties' daughter "is currently twenty years old and plaintiff has provided the Court with no evidence that [their daughter] is currently enrolled in college. Further, there is no evidence before the Court that [their daughter] is unable to be self-supporting."

Following the Family Part's entry of the January 16, 2009 emancipation order, plaintiff filed several motions, including motions for reconsideration, in an attempt to have the emancipation order vacated, to compel defendant to pay child support, and to compel defendant to pay a share of their daughter's medical and dental expenses. The motions were denied. Plaintiff did not appeal from the emancipation order or from any of the orders denying her motions to have the emancipation order vacated.

On April 24, 2010, plaintiff filed a motion to "unemancipate [their daughter], since November 12, 2008," and compel defendant to pay "[c]hild support and health insurance ($74.69 since [November] 2008 emancipation)," on the basis that their daughter was a full-time student. On June 8, 2010, the Family Part denied the motion. Plaintiff appealed.

The scope of our review is limited. "[F]indings by the trial court are binding on appeal when supported by adequate, substantial, credible evidence." Cesare v. Cesare, 154 N.J. 394, 411-12 (1998). Moreover "[b]ecause of the family courts' special jurisdiction and expertise in family matters, appellate courts should accord deference to family court factfinding." Id. at 413. "Trial court findings are ordinarily not disturbed unless 'they are so wholly unsupportable as to result in a denial of justice[.]'"Meshinsky v. Nichols Yacht Sales, Inc., 110 N.J. 464, 475 (1988) (quoting Rova Farms Resort, Inc. v. Investors Ins. Co. of Am., 65 N.J. 474, 483-84 (1974)).

A child's emancipation is "the conclusion of the fundamental dependent relationship between parent and child . . . [,]"Dolce v. Dolce, 383 N.J. Super. 11, 17 (App. Div. 2006), and is "the act by which a parent relinquishes the right to custody and is relieved of the duty to support a child." Newburgh v. Arrigo, 88 N.J. 529, 543 (1982). The determination of whether a child is emancipated is fact sensitive. Ibid. Generally, the question of emancipation hinges upon whether the children, have moved "beyond the sphere of influence" of their parents and have the ability and responsibility to support themselves as adults.Filippone v. Lee, 304 N.J. Super. 301, 308 (App. Div. 1997) (quoting Bishop v. Bishop, 287 N.J. Super. 593, 598 (Ch. Div. 1995)).

A child's "[a]ttainment of age [eighteen] establishes prima facie, but not conclusive, proof of emancipation."Newburgh, supra, 88 N.J. at 543. The parents are not ordinarily obligated to support their children after they have reached the age of majority. Weitzman v. Weitzman, 228 N.J. Super. 346, 356 (App. Div. 1998), certif. denied, 114 N.J. 505 (1989). A parent may, however, be required to continue to support a child over age eighteen enrolled in a full-time educational program.See Newburgh, supra, 88 N.J. at 543 (stating "the privilege of parenthood carries with it the duty to assure a necessary education for children[,]" requiring the continuation of support); see also Limpert v. Limpert, 119 N.J. Super. 438, 442 (App. Div. 1972) (holding that the father had an obligation to support his son while he was a full-time college student).

The Family Part ruled that the documents provided by plaintiff to support her motion were insufficient to establish the "threshold showing that [their daughter] is presently enrolled . . . on a full-time basis." The Family Part determined that a registrar's letter confirmed their daughter was enrolled full-time in community college in the Fall 2007 and Spring 2008 semesters, but attendance at college dating back two years did not support plaintiff's application to unemancipate their daughter. The court also noted that the transcript from another community college for the Spring 2009 semester did not establish that the parties' daughter was enrolled in community college on a full-time basis. Moreover, plaintiff presented no evidence that their daughter was unable to support herself. Cf. Tretola v. Tretola, 389 N.J. Super. 15, 19-20 (App. Div. 2006) (noting that whether a full-time student is still dependent on his or her family for support is a factor to be considered in determining whether the child is emancipated). Having reviewed the record, we find no reason to disturb the Family Part's findings.

Plaintiff also contends defendant is obligated to pay child support and contribute to their daughter's health insurance coverage from November 2008 through June 2010. However, a child's emancipation terminates a parent's child support obligation. See Colca v. Anson, 413 N.J. Super. 405, 415 (App. Div. 2010). Because the parties' daughter has been emancipated, defendant is no longer obligated to pay child support, including insurance coverage.

Affirmed.